

This document consists of
30 pages. No. of
copies, Series B.

DRAFT U.S. POSITION PAPER

ON

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POSTS

I. The Problem

The U.S. Treaty Outline of April 18, 1962, contains in Stage I, section E.2, a reference to the establishment of observation posts as one of a group of measures to reduce the risk of war in the context of general and complete disarmament. This paper sets forth the United States position on the establishment of observation posts as one of the separable, initial measures that could be taken prior to agreement on Stage I. (It supersedes those portions of DMP#17/1 of April 11, 1962, which deal with observation posts.)

II. Recommendations

1. The U.S. Delegation should reiterate that it favors the establishment of observation posts (OP) in certain parts of Europe, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. as a separable, initial measure that could be of value in enhancing military security, strengthening international confidence and facilitating progress toward future arms control and disarmament measures. Any OP system established prior to Stage I of an agreement on general and complete disarmament should be experimental, and subject to periodic review.

2. Following the determination of a favorable consensus in the North Atlantic Council, the U.S. Delegation should initiate discussions with the U.S.S.R. on an OP system having the scope, capabilities and characteristics set forth below. To enable each NATO member to safeguard its national interests and to participate directly in the negotiations at the appropriate time, the NAC will be kept closely informed of the course of negotiations.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year
intervals; not
automatically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

-2-

3. To avoid creating a false sense of security, the U.S. should insist on a system of demonstrable practical value for those threats with which it deals, rejecting any system lacking military utility or one intended merely as a symbolic gesture to serve primarily political ends. The limitations of the proposed system should be noted frankly in both private and public comment.

4. The U.S. should oppose any OP arrangements that would enhance the status of the GDR, formally equate NATO and the Warsaw Pact, or serve to consolidate the status quo in Central Europe. Rather, the U.S. should, as appropriate, stress its view that, by enhancing military security in Europe, an OP system of the kind discussed below should facilitate progress toward the reunification of Germany.

5. While continuing to oppose a link of the kind the Soviets have proposed to troop reductions and denuclearization in Germany, the U.S. should seek to avoid having the negotiations break prematurely on this issue. Instead the U.S. should probe for confirmation of various informal indications that the Soviets may be willing to make substantial modifications in their proposed linkage.

III. Summary Conclusions

An OP agreement of the kind that might be negotiable with the U.S.S.R. could have the following advantages and disadvantages:

1. Advantages

By supplying early warning of military build-ups, an effective OP system would increase the time available for diplomatic and military responses designed to prevent the outbreak of hostilities and improve the capabilities for defense. Since OP contribute more to each side's defensive capabilities than to its offensive capabilities, they could help to promote increased military stability in Europe and slow down the arms race in that area. They would force any country planning a surprise attack either to deny itself the use of facilities

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

monitored by the posts or else lose the benefits of surprise. Thus, they would either help to deter a country from initiating such an attack or, failing that, assist the other side to repel the attack. They could also provide more reliable and timely information during an international crisis and help to reduce the risk of war through misunderstanding of the military posture of the other side.

An OP agreement could also provide important ancillary benefits to the West. It would open up for close observation various localities in the U.S.S.R. and in the Satellites now seldom seen by Western observers. It would substantially improve our capability for the overt collection of general information on Soviet Bloc military, economic and political conditions. The advantage gained by the West in this area would considerably outweigh any similar advantage for the Soviets given the intelligence problem faced by each side. It would establish a precedent for Soviet acceptance of inspection to verify later disarmament agreements and might itself help to verify certain arms control measures instituted along with the OP, such as advance notification of certain types of military movements.

It may foster a greater sense of confidence in the Satellites by providing a means for reassuring themselves about Western intentions. This could contribute to the trend to assert greater independence from Soviet controls. Finally, it would strengthen European security generally and thereby create a better atmosphere for a just solution of the German problem.

2. Disadvantages

The military information provided by an OP system could, in certain circumstances, favor an aggressor. Thus, in the context of a Soviet-generated crisis situation, OP could enable the Soviets to ascertain with greater certainty than is now possible whether the West is preparing a firm military response and, if so, what its scope and timing are likely to be.

Discussion of a possible OP agreement could be used by the Soviets to foster disunity in the West. Agreement on

~~SECRET~~

-4-

a system likely to prove negotiable with the Soviets could create a false sense of security in Europe, thereby making it more difficult for NATO members to meet their force and readiness goals.

IV. Elements of an Observation Post System

Objectives

Basically, the operational function of OP is to increase the probability of timely warning of possible hostile action by opposing military forces. Of course no set of OP can guarantee such warning for any specified type of hostile action. Moreover, for certain types of hostile action, such as the "bolt from the blue" surprise missile attack, it is doubtful that any system of posts could provide useful warning. However, for a wide range of more probable contingencies, a properly designed system of observation posts can substantially improve the probability of useful warning. The increased probability that such warning would be available, and would allow the defense to increase its readiness, should in itself help to deter such an attack.

Of course, if a nation were planning a deliberate attack, it is very unlikely that they would allow the OP to remain; but the removal of the posts, in itself, would provide strategic warning. Similarly, even in time of crisis, the relevant OP would almost certainly be put out of operation before an aggressive action was taken; but this also would provide warning.

In effect, OP can provide evidence of good faith by the fact that they are permitted to remain. In time of crisis this could be very valuable.

However, to perform this function they must be designed so that if they were allowed to remain, they could give warning. In short, they cannot provide valid reassurance unless they are designed to be effective. One can expect that they will remain only so long as both sides believe that such mutual reassurance is useful.

SECRET

SECRET

-5-

Almost any useful system of posts in which the principle of reciprocity is maintained will be militarily more advantageous to the West than to the Soviet Bloc -- both because the posture of the West is defensive, and because our open society provides the Soviets with much information at present.

The objectives of OP can best be considered in terms of specific functions related to various types of hostile action which an ideal OP system should be able to perform.

1. The Ground Threat

- a. Provide indications of preparations for probing actions or "limited objective" attacks in Central Europe (or elsewhere) using forces already in position.
- b. Provide indications of a gradual build-up of forces over a period of many months which might precede a large-scale attack in Central Europe, or elsewhere.
- c. Provide more reliable and timely indications of a large-scale rapid build-up of military forces preparatory to a large-scale military attack in Central Europe (or elsewhere).

2. The Tactical Air Threat

- a. Provide warning of hostile probing action using aircraft only, such as in the Berlin area.
- b. Provide warning of tactical air preparations to support various types of ground activity.

3. The Strategic Threat

- a. Provide indication of preparations for an aircraft and/or missile strike against Western Europe, in time of tension, or otherwise.

~~SECRET~~

-6-

- b. Provide indication of preparation for an inter-continental aircraft and/or missile strike, in time of tension, or otherwise.

Of course any observation post system, of value in any of these roles, will also contribute to increased intelligence on force levels, equipment, and routine combat readiness in the areas under surveillance. Other useful intelligence may also become available as a by-product. Because of the existing information asymmetry any increased availability of such intelligence to both sides would work to our advantage. To maximize the prospect of obtaining such intelligence, our negotiators should seek to negotiate as much access for the observation posts as possible. However, to demand too much access could make such an agreement totally non-negotiable with the Soviets and could result in premature termination of the negotiations. Therefore, the OP systems proposed should be designed to make them effective in providing the essential warning information, but should not include features designed primarily to improve clandestine intelligence. The systems will have to function overtly and under surveillance by the host governments.

Negotiating Considerations

Since it is not known at this time how many posts or what operational modalities can be negotiated with the Soviet Union (or even what number and types of posts would be acceptable to our allies) it is essential to maintain a flexible negotiating position. The system of posts described in this paper therefore should be considered primarily as an illustrative example. It is to be used initially as a basis for consultations with our allies in order to outline and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of various types of systems.

It will be necessary to give consideration to a full range of possible capabilities for a useful OP system, recognizing that some desirable features will almost certainly not be negotiable, and that others may not be essential to deal with the threats covered by whatever system may prove negotiable to both sides. The minimum requirement for a useful system is that it must have practical military value for those

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-7-

threats with which it deals. While a useful system need not deal with all possible threats, we should reject one intended primarily as a symbolic gesture or designed to serve primarily political ends.

Illustrative System of Posts

The proposed system of posts as listed in Annex A consists of four basic groups, which complement each other. (The list in Annex A is drawn from a more complete list in Annex B which is designed to provide for various negotiating contingencies.) The first three groups deal primarily with the ground threat, although they naturally would be of value in a coordinated ground/air attack.

The last group deals primarily with the tactical and strategic air threat and should be considered a separate negotiating issue.

The four groups of posts are as follows:

- A. A border group of posts to monitor movements between the U.S.S.R. and the satellites.
- B. Supplementary transportation centers in the U.S.S.R. and the satellites.
- C. Posts with air surveillance teams in an agreed area.
- D. Observation posts at military air bases.

In addition, as a collateral measure, we should propose a system of observers with the "foreign" troop units located in Germany. Such a system should be manned on a Four-Power basis to avoid any participation or increase in status of the GDR. Each of these components will be described separately, together with a brief analysis of its contribution to objectives considered earlier.

~~SECRET~~

The Border Posts (Group A)

Location of Posts

In the illustrative example, (see Enclosure A) this first group is composed of 24 posts. Seventeen of the posts in this group are located at the transloading sites of "change of gauge" points between the railway system of the Soviet Union and the satellites. These 17 posts can monitor all railroad traffic moving between the satellites and the U.S.S.R. In addition, the group includes two posts designed to monitor rail movement into the Caucasus which could constitute a threat to the Turkish eastern frontier. The group also includes three northern ports designed to monitor movement by ship in the Baltic which could bypass the railway CP. To deal with the threat of attack on Northern Norway, this group also includes two posts, one at Petrozavodsk and one at Kandalaksha, to give warning of any forward movement of Soviet divisions in this area.

Functions

All the posts in this group are transportation-type posts. That is, the teams located at these posts would have the responsibility of monitoring transportation activity within their area of responsibility. Posts located at seaports would monitor loading and unloading of ships, as well as traffic to and from the port by road, rail and sea. Observers located at the transloading sites would monitor activities at the various transloading sites along the particular rail line they were assigned. Observers located at major rail and road transportation centers would monitor rail and road traffic passing through the center for which they were responsible.

Area of Access

In each case the specified area of access for the observers would be determined by the geographic extent of the transportation complex, taking into account nearby routes which might bypass the complex. In cases where observers were responsible for activities at two or more separate locations, their freedom to move without interference from one location

~~SECRET~~

-9-

to another would be defined in the agreement. The observers would be equipped with appropriate transportation to allow them to monitor their assigned transportation complex effectively. Their transportation would include automobiles and, in appropriate cases, might also include helicopters. However, the freedom of movement of the observers even by air would be limited to the specific transportation complex for which they were responsible. While access to other areas as a matter of courtesy would normally be permitted (much as for tourists) such access would not be considered an intrinsic element of the agreement.

Relation to Threats

Since the bulk of Soviet forces which might be used as reinforcements are located in the Western part of the U.S.S.R., the location of observation posts along the Soviet/satellite border should provide both prompt and reliable early warning of a large-scale Western movement of Soviet forces. Such warning would give more time for both diplomatic responses to try to avert hostilities, and for alerting and reinforcing NATO forces.

Value (threat 1-c)

In connection with the central front this first group of posts (Group A) would be useful primarily in connection with the threat 1-c, involving a rapid build-up of ground forces in the satellite areas. The rapid build-up of a 50 to 60 Soviet division striking force in East Germany and Western Czechoslovakia would require at least 15 days of reinforcement activities using the full capacity of the transportation system. Most of this reinforcement would be by rail since the available road, air and water transport would not add significantly to the reinforcement rate. Any movement approaching this magnitude could be reliably detected by this group of posts. Indeed, it seems unlikely that such a movement would not be detected even by our existing intelligence capabilities, but warning by the observation posts system should be both more reliable and more prompt. To be sure that such warning would remain reliable, provision should be made to negotiate new posts if rail lines are built that would bypass existing posts.

~~SECRET~~

-10-

Value (threat 1-b)

In addition this set of posts would be of considerable value in connection with a more gradual build-up of forces in the satellites. It seems likely that a gradual build-up might be detected (as a consequence of changes in the observed traffic patterns) even if the actual movement as it went past the posts occurred over small secondary roads or highways which bypass this group of posts.

Value (threat 1-a)

This group of posts of course would not be of any value in connection with the ground threat 1-a involving harassment or an attack with "limited objectives" by forces already in position in or near Germany. Indeed it is unlikely that any system of fixed observation posts could be of much value in connection with this threat. The forces involved are so close to the probable line of contact that the time interval between when the forces might begin to move and when they would make contact with opposing forces would be too short to give useful warning. In addition the deployment of the forces in this area is such that stationary posts could easily be bypassed, unless there were an extremely large number of posts. We believe that early warning for this type of threat can best be provided by observers assigned to the specific troop units in the area. (This concept is discussed later.)

Net Value (Central Front)

Nevertheless, reliable early warning in connection with threat 1-c (rapid reinforcement), and an improved capability for threat 1-b, (gradual reinforcement), would be of very considerable military value. The large-scale ground threat involved in these contingencies is one for which NATO has planned a nuclear defense. Reliable early warning against such a threat should provide time for the political consultations needed to make this decision. In addition it should allow time for the U.S. to airlift reinforcements to the European theater or for the UK to move in reinforcements. The fact that this set of defensive alternatives would become available to NATO should materially improve our ability to deter such an attack.

~~SECRET~~

-11-

It might be argued that if such OP's were in place the Soviets could simply begin a surprise attack with the forces normally located in East Germany, and only when bring forces across the Soviet border. This option, while possible, would involve a great risk. It would give the allies an opportunity to carry out extensive interdiction before any significant reinforcements had moved out of the rear areas.

Value (Northern Area)

In the northern area the fact that one of the two posts (Kandalaksha) chosen also coincides with a local troop concentration should help to make these posts useful in providing warning of any of the three types of ground threat. (Another post included in the next group of posts at Murmansk is collocated with the other large troop concentration in this area and should further improve warning in this area.)

Value (Southern Area)

In the Southern area two posts monitor movement of troops into the Caucasus area. While these two posts would probably pick up large scale rail reinforcement of these units, there are already sufficiently large numbers of troops in the Southern Caucasus area to constitute a very substantial threat to NATO forces in the area even without reinforcement. Warning associated with this existing threat would have to be provided by posts in the immediate area. Such posts are included in the second component of this system.

Supplementary Posts at Transportation Centers (Group B)

Description

The posts in this group (see Table B of Annex A) total 39, of which 26 are in the U.S.S.R. and 13 in the satellites. The posts in this group are based on the assumption that air surveillance within the Soviet Union proper would not be negotiable, but might be negotiable within the satellites. All posts in this group are at transportation centers. Thus the same principles concerning access and availability of transportation described for the border posts apply to these as well. In this

~~SECRET~~

-12-

group, the functions of posts in the U.S.S.R. are somewhat different than the functions of posts in the satellites.

Value of Posts in Satellites

With regard to the threat in the Central European area, the supplementary posts in the satellites are intended primarily to monitor shifts of military forces within the satellite area that might result in an increased threat at some specific time and place. The posts should also be useful in detecting gradual increases in force levels within the satellites that might take place without producing a clear indication at the border system of posts. In addition, the presence of Western observers at a number of important urban centers within the satellites, should improve our knowledge of political and other developments in the area.

Because fixed observation posts are of such little value in the immediate forward area where most of the ready forces are concentrated, no fixed posts have been suggested in the East German area.

Value of Posts in U.S.S.R.

Generally speaking, however, the supplementary posts within the U.S.S.R. are of greater importance than those within the satellites. While these posts cannot provide anything like assured warning, they should substantially increase our chance of getting warning of an impending ground attack several days to weeks before there would be an indication at the border posts. One of the more likely ways such warning might be obtained would be from abnormal movements of railroad flat cars preparatory to loading tanks and armored equipment at military bases. While the number of posts suggested in this group could not possibly cover the very numerous areas where such flat cars would be loaded, they can maintain normal traffic statistics at major rail centers. Such a large loading operation at many bases should result in a substantial change in the patterns of traffic flow which could be picked up by the suggested OP. Clearly, warning of this type could never be definitive since it might result from a variety of other causes.

-13-

Nevertheless, it could serve to prepare the West, so that certain long lead time alerting operations could be undertaken.

This group of posts also includes some posts in the immediate area of the Southern Caucasus intended to improve the probability of warning associated with hostile activity by the forces already deployed in that area.

The group also includes observers at a number of ports. These observers could report on any unusual changes in the state of readiness of forces at the ports or on the departure of ships from any port areas that might be potential military targets. Such an indication could of course be either offensive or defensive and would have little meaning in time of major crisis. However, if such precautionary measures were to be taken at other times it could provide important early warning of a possible impending crisis.

Posts with Aerial Surveillance Teams (Group C)

Value

This component of the system, for reasons of negotiability, covers the satellite countries only. It would make it possible for a smaller number of observers to do a better job monitoring military movements within that area. It enhances the capability of the system to recognize a military build-up in the area even if it takes place slowly over a period of many months.

Negotiability with U.S.S.R.

This portion of the system is derived from the 1958 Soviet proposal which suggested a zone of aerial surveillance over Western Europe extending 800 kilometers east and west of the line of confrontation. While the Soviets may not be willing to accept this proposal at the present time, it seems desirable to include it in our initial presentation. The addition of aerial surveillance to the system results in both an increase in efficiency and effectiveness and decrease in the number of observation posts involved so that it might in the end prove acceptable. With aerial surveillance teams included in the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-14-

satellites the number of supplementary observation posts required within the satellites is much less than in the U.S.S.R. and much smaller than would otherwise be needed.

"Open Sky" type of aerial surveillance operating from bases outside the host country has been omitted from this illustrative example. The introduction of this concept, in our initial presentation, could be disruptive to the negotiation because of Soviet identification of such activities with the U-2 and unilateral intelligence operations. It would of course provide an acceptable alternative from a Western point of view.

Location

Aerial surveillance teams could be based at the capital of each of the satellite countries and be allowed freedom to cover each country at will (within restrictions required by air safety considerations). In total, five such aerial surveillance posts are suggested at the five satellite capitals: Prague, Budapest, Bucharest, Warsaw, and Sophia. These posts located at the capitals would also serve as contact points for dealing with the host governments. These same posts would have responsibility on the ground for monitoring transportation movements within the local transportation complex (essentially as in other transportation type posts). They would also serve as the local headquarters for other OP within each satellite country.

While similar aerial surveillance teams are not included in the proposed system for the Soviet Union, we should certainly probe the Soviets to determine whether or not they would be willing to accept such teams within the Soviet Union in return for a smaller number of posts in the U.S.S.R. and similar teams located in the United States. An illustrative more limited list of such transportation posts for use with aerial surveillance teams in the Soviet Union can be obtained in Annex B.

The East German Problem

It should be noted, however, that the concept of air surveillance introduces serious obstacles to a successful negotiation, particularly as regards East Germany. There seems to

~~SECRET~~

-15-

be no sound military reason for recommending that air surveillance not include East Germany. One could argue that, as long as we have the present military liaison missions there, and especially if we also obtain observers with troop units, such air mobility is not required, but it would certainly be desirable. Since the U.S.S.R. does not presently appear to favor air surveillance anyway, it would probably not grant air surveillance of the GDR except by insisting on direct negotiation with the GDR. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. is very unlikely to accept air surveillance over any of the satellites without obtaining it over West Germany. While the system of posts proposed herein does not call for aerial surveillance over any of Germany, this position is not likely to be negotiable.

Even if as expected, air surveillance proves to be unacceptable to the Soviet Union, a discussion of this element should serve to justify other Western desires such as an adequate number of OP in the Soviet Bloc, or adequate access requirements, including, if possible, the use of helicopters within the specific complexes monitored by OP.

Posts at Military Air Bases (Group D)

The possible value of observation posts at military air bases will be discussed in terms of the two non-ground threats considered under objectives above: the tactical air threat and the strategic threat.

Potential Value (Threat 2-a)

It is difficult to visualize any serious tactical aircraft threat that would not be part of a coordinated effort involving ground forces as well. One possible exception, however, is the harassment of the corridors to Berlin. This type of activity would involve such a small number of aircraft that it is unlikely that any conceivable OP system could provide useful warning of it.

~~SECRET~~

-16-

Potential Value (Current 2-b)

One would expect that larger scale air activity would be fully coordinated with ground operations. Even if no specific ground harassment were planned, it seems highly improbable that the ground forces would not be involved at least to the extent of a substantial alert. Thus the types of warning which might be obtained from tactical air bases must be compared in timeliness and reliability with information that could be obtained by monitoring large troop units.

Air units are ordinarily maintained in a higher state of alert, and the time delay from a decision to act until aircraft are actually in the air should be substantially shorter than the corresponding time for ground forces. Most of the aircraft that would participate in such limited tactical air operations are located in the East German area. Large scale air operations from these bases are already under surveillance by radar systems in Germany and West Berlin. Moreover, a very large number of observation posts would be required to monitor any significant fraction of the force. Unless a substantial fraction of the air bases were covered, hostile activities could take place effectively using only those air bases not monitored. For these reasons the value of observation posts at tactical air bases in East Germany is considered sufficiently small that they are not included in the initial package. This helps to avoid political problems that would be involved if it were necessary to negotiate directly with the East Germans. Observation posts at Soviet-occupied tactical air bases in some of the other satellites would, of course, have some limited value but not enough to assign them a high priority.

Potential Strategic Value

When air base OP are considered from the point of view of the strategic threat (associated with a large-scale nuclear attack), the value is once again quite limited because such strategic attacks could be launched using only ballistic missiles in the initial strike.

Potential Value (threat 3-a)

This is particularly relevant when considering an attack on Western Europe. At the present time the Soviet Union has such a large supply of MRBM's and IRBM's that could be used against Europe that the role, or importance, of tactical aircraft could be extremely limited in an initial strike.

Nevertheless, observers at such tactical nuclear air bases could face the Soviets with a significant dilemma in launching such an attack. The U.S.S.R. would have to plan on a prompt counter strike by POLARIS missiles and ICBM's from the United States. To leave aircraft in a low state of readiness would make them vulnerable to such an attack. On the other hand, if the aircraft were to be placed in a high state of readiness to take off simultaneously with the missile strike, indications of this state of readiness could be picked up by observers at the air bases, although the warning time might be very short.

Thus, observers at these bases would have some value in a "bolt-from-the-blue" attack. The existence of observers would result either in providing earlier warning of the attack sufficient for NATO aircraft to go on ground or air alert, or would result in a marked decrease in Soviet aircraft that would survive for later follow-on attack.

Unfortunately, however, the number of such tactical air bases that it would be necessary to monitor is exceedingly large. Consequently, while there will be some value in maintaining observers at all such air bases, individual posts at such bases have to be accorded only a low to medium priority. While there are a number of Soviet tactical aircraft located in the satellites, there is no definite evidence that these are equipped with nuclear weapons. The bulk of the aircraft that would be involved in a nuclear strike are located in the Soviet Union.

Relation to threat 3-b

On the other hand, it is extremely unlikely that the Soviet Union would initiate a major strategic strike at Europe

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-18-

without simultaneously targeting the United States. Even if they were to choose to do so, it seems certain that they would at least place their intercontinental strategic bombers in a state of high alert. These alerting activities could be detected by observers located at the appropriate long-range air bases. In this case the number of air bases involved is very much smaller and, consequently, the value of individual observation posts at the heavy and medium bomber bases is considerably higher.

Potential Value (threat 3-b)

Of course, even a surprise nuclear attack against the United States could be mounted with missiles only, but (in the absence of observation posts) this is probably not the way such an attack would be mounted. A more probable strategy would be to launch the bombers first, so that they would be on their way, but well outside radar range, at the time of the missile attack. If the bombers were used in this way with OP's (which seems unlikely), a warning time for the U.S. mainland of about 4-6 hours would result. Because of the relatively low alert status of the Soviet forces, longer warning times would be likely. These times are well within practical limits from the point of view of OP communications. They are also long enough to permit valuable defense measures to be applied.

Again, if the initial attack were mounted using missiles only, to gain maximum surprise, such OP's would, in effect, perform the function of grounding the bombers from use in the initial strike, leaving many vulnerable for retaliatory attack. Considering that the Soviets have almost 200 heavy bombers and 1200 medium bombers, this would be a very useful OP function.

Suggested Posts

Accordingly, the proposed list of posts at air bases gives highest priority to the strategic bomber bases. In considering how to distribute OP at military air bases, it is important to recognize that a nation planning a surprise attack would try to plan it without employing those bases monitored by

~~SECRET~~

-19-

observation posts. Thus, to be militarily significant, OP's would have to be placed at a substantial fraction (probably at least 50%) of the total number of air bases of any type.

To avoid making the number of OP suggested in the initial package appear excessive, it has been limited to 15. This provides coverage of the most important strategic bomber bases in the Soviet Union. However, from the Soviet point of view, this number is by no means adequate to provide coverage for the most important bomber bases in the United States. It can be expected, therefore, that if the Soviets are interested in OP's at strategic air bases, they will wish to increase the number on our side well above the 15 suggested in this initial package. If so, it would be appropriate for the West to add to its list of recommended posts a number of long-range and tactical air bases taken out of the Priority II list of air bases shown in Annex B.

The observers at these air base posts would be equipped with ground transportation to move around the immediate vicinity at the post and their freedom to do so would be specified in the agreement. They would be responsible for monitoring take-offs and landings and for the state of readiness of aircraft at the air base.

Area Mobile Ground Observation Teams

The concept of area mobile ground observation teams, to range over a wide area (similar to the air surveillance teams) has been omitted from this paper. It seems clear that this concept would be one of the most objectionable to the U.S.S.R. and could also raise difficult problems in the NATO area. Such ground mobile observation teams would also raise all the same difficult political problems encountered with air mobility.

Observers with Troop Units

Functions

Observer with troop units in the forward areas complement OP monitoring transportation centers far from the lines of

~~SECRET~~

-20-

confrontation. While the OP can give early warning of reinforcements moving toward the forward areas, the observers with the forward troop units can provide early warning of concerted activity which might indicate imminent harassment or attack. Stationary OP, as previously noted, are of very little value here. Air surveillance, in this area where almost continuous surveillance is required to provide the desired warning, would be limited in its usefulness by the prevailing cloud cover. Since periods of overcast are quite predictable, a potential aggressor could take advantage of predicted cloud cover to initiate a surprise hostile action. (Elsewhere in Europe, further from the point of contact, the main task of air surveillance is to monitor force levels. This can be done on an intermittent basis.)

To deal with the need for warning of hostile action by troops already near the point of contact the U.S. should be prepared to negotiate with the USSR for the location of observers with foreign troop units in East and West Germany. These negotiations should be handled on a Four Power basis to avoid any dealings with the East German regime.

Relation to MLM's

Of course valuable information on the movements of the Soviet troops in East Germany can be obtained by the existing military liaison missions, despite their limited size and the large restricted areas into which they are not permitted to travel at the present time. The West should be careful not to accept new arrangements in Germany which are inferior to, or more easily abrogated than, the present arrangements.

The U.S. should under no circumstances allow discussion of observers with troop units to endanger our existing military liaison missions. We should therefore minimize any connection between them, since their purposes are different, and should refuse to accept any change in their current status. Of course, if the Soviets showed interest we would be prepared to strengthen them by decreasing, on a reciprocal basis, the existing restricted areas, or even by adding additional personnel to the existing missions.

~~SECRET~~

-21-

Value

The usefulness of a system of observers with troop units will depend very strongly on the modalities, such as communication facilities, freedom of access, number of observers, and where they are stationed. The modalities described in Annex E would be generally acceptable and might be used as a basis for an initial Western proposal to the Soviet Union. However, details of the rights of access remain to be worked out later. If appropriate modalities can be negotiated, these observers would constitute one of the most valuable components of an OP system. However, they would be acceptable to the West only in the context of a wider OP system and not as a separate measure.

Advance Notification of Military Movements

This measure is closely linked to the observation post question, in that advance notification of troop movements would facilitate the work of observation post observers. It is expected that as a matter of courtesy, and to avoid the reporting of misleading information by the OP, host nations will voluntarily notify the observing nations in advance of any movement or maneuvers of military forces which are likely to be detected by the OP.

Expanded Radar Coverage (Overlapping Radar)

It is clear that an extension of our radar coverage into Soviet Bloc territory, accompanied by extension of Soviet radar coverage into NATO territory could improve warning of air strikes and thus help the defensive capabilities of both sides. Such radars therefore might be added to the system at any time during negotiations, or even after OP's were installed.

However, the present illustrative system is already complex. Since extended radar coverage, unlike the observers with the troop units, does not fill a critical gap in the system, it seems advisable not to introduce the additional radar coverage at this time, although its possible utility might be noted. A separate paper on extended radar coverage however should be prepared to be introduced at an appropriate stage in the negotiation.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
-22-

Operational Modalities of Observation Posts

General

One of the basic questions concerning OP involves the degree to which observers will have free access, and the degree to which the host country will be able to monitor the activities of the observers. This is a particularly sensitive issue, because it will not only have a decisive effect on the value of the observation posts, but can also determine whether the operation of the posts will reduce or add to existing international tensions. The main principles which should guide the United States position on this subject are as follows:

a. The observers should be granted enough freedom of movement to monitor adequately the activities for which they are responsible;

b. They should also be granted enough freedom to allow them to maintain reasonable living conditions. (This would involve, for example, access to a nearby town or city and freedom to use stores and other similar facilities.)

c. All activities of the observation teams should be overt. The host country should have full freedom of access (within reasonable limits of privacy) to the activities of the observers, so that it can assure itself that the team is not being used for espionage.

d. Whatever rules are agreed to should be reciprocal and strictly enforced. A detected violation of the rules could have serious consequences.

To implement this approach, the host country should supply at least one liaison officer for each observation team to assist them in their relations with the local government and populations. A liaison officer would be free to accompany the observers on all official tours in the performance of their responsibility. The U.S. should insist on the adversary principle in the manning of posts, with host government liaison personnel exercising no command function.

~~SECRET~~

-23-

On the basis of these basic principles, the degree of access, communications facilities, and other modalities for each type of post should be agreed to in considerable detail.

Communications

The observer teams might normally use communication facilities provided by the host country. In order to avoid suspicion of espionage, the messages should be open to the host country, but a method of authentication should be used. To avoid misunderstanding of routine reports by the press, a code might be used that was known both to the host country and the observers.

Messages should be scheduled in such a manner that failure to receive a properly authenticated message would provide timely warning. It would be desirable to provide emergency radio-transmitting equipment as a back-up, in case there is a real or bogus failure of the host nation's communications facilities. Each side should make its own arrangements for collecting and evaluating the reports sent by the OP.

The foregoing arrangements are intended to make the OP unattractive for espionage activities. It is clear that if posts became involved in large-scale espionage activities, they would cease to be welcome and would probably aggravate, rather than reduce, international tensions. This approach will necessarily limit the posts to overt activities.

Area of Access

In connection with the definition of access for the observation teams, it would be preferable that no effort be made to define a universal rule, such as a 15-mile radius. Instead, the top-level negotiating team should determine in general terms what each post is established to monitor. Using basic agreed modalities for each type of post, teams of experts should then define in detail the area of access required to monitor the activities involved. (Access to additional areas would normally be granted reciprocally as a matter of courtesy, just as for tourists). These basic required areas of access should be clearly defined as an integral part of the agreement.

~~SECRET~~

-24-

Disputes

It may be necessary to establish some coordinating mechanism between the two sides where operational problems can be considered and disputes as to the functioning of the posts ironed out. To avoid any formal equation of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, such a mechanism might be provided by periodic meetings between representatives of the countries participating on each side.

An Annex E, to be developed later, will contain a more detailed treatment of operational modalities for observation posts, including manpower, equipment and communication requirements. It should be recognized that the value of the system could be lost if these arrangements are unsatisfactory.

Probable Soviet Bloc Requirements for Observation Posts

Reciprocity

While it is important to maintain a principle of approximate reciprocity on the number and type of observation posts on both sides, it is not possible or desirable to obtain actual symmetry. The military and geographic situations are not symmetrical, and consequently, the needs for posts on both sides are not symmetrical. This lack of symmetry is acknowledged in the attached illustrative list of posts on NATO territory, in that the numbers of posts in each of the four groups are slightly different than for the illustrative list on Soviet Bloc territory. However, to maintain the principle of reciprocity the total number of posts on both sides is kept equal.

This equality works to the advantage of the West, because in almost all categories of posts a larger number is required to provide the Soviet Bloc with a system comparable in effectiveness to the proposed NATO system.

To illustrate this fact, only 17 posts are required to monitor the bulk of traffic between the U.S.S.R. and the satellites. To accomplish the same thing between the U.S. and Europe would require posts either at all major Western European

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-25-

ports or at all U.S. ports. In terms of the supplementary transportation centers, the number of such major centers in the U.S. exceeds those in the U.S.S.R. while the number in NATO Europe far exceeds those in the satellites. The present proposal suggests five posts with air surveillance teams, one at each satellite capital. To provide the same coverage in each Western capital would require nine posts even if Luxembourg were omitted. The present proposal suggests OP's at 15 Soviet strategic long-range air bases. To provide the same coverage over comparable U.S. bases would require about 40 posts.

Thus it can be expected that the Soviets will continue to demand posts on more than a one-for-one basis. Their 1958 proposal, for example, included 28 posts in Soviet Bloc territory and 54 posts in Western territory. The West may be able to counter this argument somewhat by pointing out that posts at Western cities cover more area and a greater volume of traffic than posts at most Soviet cities or at the transloading sites and above all by stressing the distance and logistics problem faced by the U.S. in reinforcing its troops in Europe as compared with the Soviet capability.

Soviet Military Interests

We can expect that from a Soviet military point of view, their greatest interest would center on the observers with troops in Germany, because of their professed fear of German action or an over-response by the West to any harassment in the Berlin area.

Their interest in monitoring reinforcements to Germany from the U.S. or the rest of NATO would probably not be very great because of their ability to obtain such data from other sources. On the other hand, if Khrushchev is looking for an excuse to reduce Soviet forces in Germany -- despite objections from his own military advisors -- the introduction of posts to monitor such reinforcements might provide an excuse.

It would seem probable that the Soviets might have a real interest in posts at strategic air bases in the United States. In view of the openness of our society otherwise, it is likely

~~SECRET~~

-26-

that they would prefer such posts even at the expense of not obtaining posts at U.S. seaports or rail centers. In fact, the rail and road net in the United States is so dense that it is essentially hopeless to monitor with fixed posts. In general in the U.S., ports make the only attractive locations for transportation type OP's.

Illustrative List

An illustrative list of posts that the USSR might desire, and which matches the proposed Western list in total numbers, is included in Annex A. This list may be useful in discussions in NATO. However, it should be emphasized that so long as the principle of reciprocity is maintained, we would expect the U.S.S.R. to inform us what type of system of posts it would consider interesting.

The example shown in Annex A, however, was designed to provide approximate symmetry between the two proposed systems to avoid irresponsible charges of weighting the systems in our favor. While this effort at symmetry probably distorts Soviet interests in the U.S., it probably does not distort them badly in Europe.

The first component (Group A) of the illustrative system of posts in the NATO area is designed in analogy to the barrier posts on the Soviet satellite border. This group of posts includes railway centers in France and the Lowlands, near the German frontier. It also includes the major German ports to the North Sea, and some major U.S. ports that might be used as points of embarkation.

The second component (Group B) includes additional ports in the U.S. and supplementary ports and ground transportation centers in the rest of NATO. As it happens, no posts are suggested in Portugal or Iceland since it is hard to see what they would contribute from a Soviet point of view.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-27-

The third component (Group C) includes posts for air surveillance teams at most of the capital cities in NATO Europe. However, some capitals are omitted where they are close to other NATO capitals in the interest of keeping the list small.

The fourth component (Group D) consists of NATO airbases. The high priority ones included in the illustrative system are all in the United States, although tactical airbases in Europe are listed in the more detailed tabulation in Annex C.

The military value of observation posts from a Soviet point of view is likely to depend greatly on the willingness of NATO nations to accept posts on their territory.

Further discussion of the rationale for the illustrative list of posts in NATO, from a Soviet point of view, is included in Annex C. This Annex also contains a more complete list of posts in the NATO area which were used to construct the example in Annex A.

The above illustrative list of posts in the NATO area is included as an aid to NATO planning and to assist the U.S. Delegation in evaluating any list presented by the Soviets. It is not intended for transmission to the Soviets.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
28

V. Political Considerations Affecting Negotiations with the Soviets

From the "Summary of Past Discussion of Observation Posts" attached as Annex F, it will be seen that Soviet proposals for "ground control posts" have been subject to considerable variation since first advanced in 1955. Though set forth with varying nuances and lately with hints of possible modification, the one constant theme has been that OP must be linked to disarmament measures and specifically to reductions of foreign forces in, and the "denuclearization" of, Germany. The implications of this approach must be seen in the light of the continued Soviet interest in a German peace treaty, a non-aggression pact and other measures to consolidate the status quo in Central Europe (while changing that of Berlin).

In short, the Soviets have not in the past shown much interest in discussing the military utility of control posts per se and have not viewed them as an arrangement to be superimposed on the existing political/military situation in Europe. Rather, they appear to have considered them as part of a process leading ultimately to a transformation of present security arrangements in Europe into something approaching a tacitly, if not overtly, cooperative system, with substantially reduced forces on both sides of the dividing line. Such an arrangement would in turn appear to imply some common understanding regarding Germany, although presumably this would remain unstated.

So long as the Soviets persist in linking OP with measures having such political connotations, we should continue to reject the linkage and there would be little prospect of a fruitful negotiation. There are indications, however, that they may be prepared to modify the link. If so, this may permit a useful discussion which, for the first time, could focus on the military utility of an OP system.

If the Soviets insist on an immediate link to at least nominal troop withdrawals, we could respond by pointing out that US troop redeployments now in process will result in a reduction of some _____ US troops in Europe from the high point of the build-up since 1960. We should suggest that it is now the turn of the USSR to make equivalent unilateral withdrawals from Germany and/or Eastern Europe.

~~SECRET~~

It is just possible that economic considerations and the military pressures generated by the dispute with China may induce the Soviets to consider the establishment of OP as a means of facilitating the future withdrawal of some Soviet troops from Central Europe. It is also possible that they may in time abandon their proposed links altogether as they have in connection with other negotiations when ready to achieve an agreement.

This would not imply that the Soviets had abandoned the political objectives which they now appear to pursue. So long as we make it clear that we are not prepared to accept an OP system lacking military utility and justified primarily on political grounds, however, this need not inhibit an OP negotiation. Moreover, we need not allow them to establish the political framework for the discussions. We should, as appropriate, set forth our view that our OP proposal would facilitate the reunification of Germany by strengthening European security and thereby creating a better atmosphere for a just solution of the German problem.

The complexities of a militarily useful OP system are such that a lengthy series of discussions would be required merely to see if there is any prospect for an agreement. This suggests the desirability of a deliberate approach to the Soviets, with a minimum of fanfare, and with public recognition of the difficulties standing in the way of agreement. It will be important to avoid bringing the negotiations to a head prematurely. Rather, we should seek to leave the matter open for discussion as long as possible to enable both sides to take changing circumstances into account. In the end a situation may arise--as it did in the case of the test ban treaty--wherein the Soviets can be brought to accept an accord on a basis which, until now, they have rejected.

VI. Modalities for Negotiations

Following an initial presentation of the broad US position in the ENDC, we should seek to arrange for a more detailed discussion in meetings of the Co-Chairmen. In view of the direct interest of other ENDC members representing the two sides, it would be expected that the Co-Chairmen would invite them to participate in their discussions.

Such discussions should be conducted on an informal basis. It would not be appropriate to establish a formal ENDC subcommittee for this purpose since that would violate the principle that ENDC

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

30

should not become involved in arrangements pertaining to a particular region.

This procedure would have the advantage of flexibility, enabling us to adjust the depth and pace of the discussions to our needs and those of our allies. It would also avoid having to deal prematurely with the problem of agreeing on the modalities of a special conference which will probably be necessary for the formal negotiation of an actual OP agreement. The problems of arranging for any such conference can be deferred until greater evidence of the possibility of reaching agreement is in hand.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIST OF ANNEXES

- ANNEX A - Illustrative Systems of Observation Posts for Both NATO and the Soviet Bloc
- ANNEX B - Locations of Observation Posts in Soviet Bloc Territory
- ANNEX C - Soviet Bloc Observation Posts in NATO Countries
- ANNEX D - Observer Teams with Foreign Troop Units in Germany
- ANNEX E - Operational Modalities for Observation Posts
- ANNEX F - Summary of Past Discussions of Observation Posts

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

ILLUSTRATIVE SYSTEMS OF OBSERVATION POSTS
FOR BOTH NATO AND THE SOVIET BLOC

PURPOSE

The purpose of this Annex is to provide a simple listing of posts for illustrative systems which can be used to open negotiations.

DISCUSSION

The NATO posts that would be located in the Soviet Bloc area are tabulated in Lists IA, IB, IC and ID. The Soviet Bloc posts that would be located in the NATO area are tabulated in Lists IIA, IIB, IIC and IID. The four lists (A, B, C, and D) for each system correspond to the four component groups of posts discussed in the main paper.

RELATION OF THIS ANNEX TO LISTS IN ANNEX B AND ANNEX C

These illustrative systems are derived directly from the lists in Annex B and Annex C. The lists IA and IIA are taken directly without modification. The lists IB and IIB were derived from the "B" lists in the later annexes on the basis that air mobility would not be available in the USSR or the USA. Therefore, posts in these two countries were derived from the alternate priority lists for these two countries. Posts for the European NATO countries and the Satellites were derived from the primary rather than the alternate lists.

Since air mobility is assumed not to be available in the US or the USSR, the posts in these two countries were dropped from the basic "C" lists to generate the "C" lists in this annex.

Posts for the "D" lists were derived directly from the "D" lists in the later enclosures except that only Priority I posts were used. Priority II and Priority III air base posts have been omitted.

~~SECRET~~

This document consists of 12 pages.
Number 50 of 200 copies. Series C.

Group 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically
declassified.

- 2 -

LIST IA

ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF TRANSPORTATION CENTERS
CONSTITUTING A BORDER "BARRIER" IN SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES

<u>Primary Post</u>	<u>Associated Transloading Stations</u>	<u>Priority</u>
1. Kaliningrad, USSR	Braniewo, Chrusciel, Bartoszyce	I
2. Skandawa, Poland	Chernyakhovsk, Krasnovka, Mozyr	"
	Novyy, Zheleznodorozhniy	
3. Suwalki, Poland	Trakizsi, Novo Moskava,	"
	Sheshtckay	
4. Sokolka, Poland	Grodno, Losos'na, Kuznica,	"
	Czarna Wies	
5. Berestovitsa, USSR	None	"
6. Narewka, Poland	Svisloch	"
7. Brest, USSR	Zhabinka, Terespol, Malaszewicze	"
8. Dorchusk, Poland	Kovel, East Yagodin, Grochonek,	"
	Chelm, Zawadowka	
9. Rava-Russkaya, USSR	None	
10. Medyka, Poland	Mostiska, Rodnia Wola, Hurko	"
	Zurawica	
11. Sambor, USSR	None	
12. Chop, USSR	Cerna, Zahony, Tuzser, Komoro	"
13. Mukachevo, USSR	Halmeu	"
14. Sighet, Rumania	None	"
15. Dornesti, Rumania	Radauti	"
16. Ungeny, USSR	Holboca, Nicolina, Iasi	"
17. Reni, USSR	Galati	"
18. Armavir, USSR	None	II
19. Astrakhan, USSR	None	"
20. Leningrad, USSR	None	"
21. Tallin, USSR	None	"
22. Riga, USSR	None	"
23. Petrozavodsk, USSR	None	"
24. Kandalaksha, USSR	None	"

SECRET

-3-

LIST IB

ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF SUPPLEMENTARY TRANSPORTATION CENTERS*

<u>City & Country</u>	<u>a/</u>	<u>b/</u>	<u>City & Country</u>	<u>a/</u>	<u>b/</u>
1. Kiev, USSR	I	25	13. Pechenga, USSR	I	36
2. Minsk, USSR	I	25	(port)		
3. Lvov, USSR	I	25	14. Baronovichi, USSR	I	22
4. Ulan Ude, USSR	I	23	15. Lutsk, USSR	I	22
5. Zhmerinka, USSR	I	25	16. Kishinev, USSR	I	22
6. Sovetsk, USSR	I	25	17. Chardzhov, USSR	I	Note 3**
7. Vilnius, USSR	I	25	18. Tashkent, USSR	I	Note 3**
8. Ternopol	I	25	19. Baku, USSR	I	Note 1**
9. Rovno, USSR	I	25	20. Tbilisi, USSR	I	Note 1**
10. Murmansk, USSR	I	36	21. Slutsk, USSR	I	25
(port)			22. Molodechno, USSR	I	25
11. Petropavlovsk,	I	36	23. Shyauliyay, USSR	I	25
USSR (port)			24. Korosten, USSR	I	25
12. Vladivostock, USSR	I	36	25. Polotsk, USSR	I	25
(port)			26. Kalinkovichi, USSR	I	25
27. Bialystok, Poland	I	16-17	32. Bratislava, Czech.	I	16-17
28. Olsztyn, Poland	I	16-17	33. Kosice, Czech.	I	16-17
29. Szczecin, Poland	I	16-17	34. Szekesfehervar,		
30. Deblin, Poland	I	16-17	Hungary	I	16-17
31. Trencin,			35. Gyor, Hungary	I	16-17
Czechoslovakia	I	16-17			

LIST IC

ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF BASES FOR AIR MOBILE
OBSERVATION TEAMS IN SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES AND USSR

<u>City & Country</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Page of</u> <u>JCSM-773-63</u>
1. Prague, Czechoslovakia	I	14
2. Budapest, Hungary	I	14
3. Bucharest, Rumania	I	14
4. Warsaw, Poland	I	14
5. Sophia, Bulgaria	I	14

a/ Priority, b/ Page of JCSM-773-63

* Arranged in approximate order of priority.

** Notes are on Page 15.

- 4 -

LIST IDILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF POSTS AT SOVIET BLOC AIR BASES

<u>Name - Country</u>	<u>Prior- ity</u>	<u>Type Base</u>	<u>Probable Supplementary Use</u>
1. Dolon, USSR	I	Heavy Bomber Home Base	
2. Engels, USSR	I	" " " "	
3. Ukraina, USSR	I	" " " "	
4. Chepelevka, USSR	I	" " " "	
5. *Siauliai, USSR	I	" " " "	
6. Olenegorsk, USSR	I	Medium Bomber Home Base	Heavy Bomber
7. Anadyr/Levinka, USSR	I	" " " "	" "
8. *Baranovichi, USSR	I	" " " "	---
9. *Ussuriysk Vozdvizhenka, USSR	I	" " " "	---
10. Mezdok, USSR	I	" " " "	---
11. Tartu, USSR	I	" " " "	---
12. Karankut, USSR	I	" " " "	---
13. Starokonstantinov, USSR	I	Light Bomber Home Base	Light Jet Bomber
14. Tbilisi/Vaziani, USSR	I	Offensive Fighter Home Base	Light Jet Bomber
15. *Chernyakhovsk, USSR	I	Light Bomber Home Base	Light Jet Bomber

* Collocated with other observation posts.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 5 -

LIST IIAILLUSIRATIVE LIST OF TRANSPORTATION CENTERS
CONSTITUTING A BORDER "BARRIER" IN NATO COUNTRIES

<u>City & Country</u>	<u>Priority</u>
1. Mulhouse, France	I
2. Strasbourg, France	I
3. Nancy, France	I
4. Metz, France	I
5. Luxembourg, Luxembourg	I
6. Liege, Belgium	I
7. Endhoven, Netherlands	I
8. Arnhem, Netherlands	I
9. Zwolle, Netherlands	I
10. Groningen, Netherlands	I
11. Tinglev, Denmark	I
12. Hamburg, Germany	I
13. Bremerhaven, Germany	I
14. Bremen, Germany	I
15. New York, U.S.	II
16. Norfolk, Newport News, U.S.	II
17. San Francisco, Alameda, Oakland, Richmond, Mare Island, U.S.	II
18. Philadelphia, U.S.	II
19. New Orleans, U.S.	II
20. Baltimore, U.S.	II
21. Boston, U.S.	II
22. Long Beach, Los Angeles, U.S.	II
23. Seattle, Tacoma, Bremerton, U.S.	II
24. Montreal, Canada	II
25. Vancouver, Canada	II

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIST 11B

ILLUSIRATIVE LIST OF
SUPPLEMENTARY TRANSPORTATION CENTERS

1. Marseille, France
2. Bordeaux, France
3. Antwerp, Belgium
4. Brussels, Belgium
5. Rotterdam, Netherlands
6. Amsterdam, Netherlands
7. Kiel, Fedl. Republic of Germany
8. Bristol, U.K.
9. Liverpool, U.K.
10. Portsmouth, U.K.
11. Charleston, U.S.
12. Duluth, Superior, U.S.
13. Chicago, U.S.
14. Houston, U.S.
15. Galveston, U.S.
16. Mobile, U.S.
17. Savannah, U.S.
18. San Diego, U.S.
19. Portland (Ore.), Vancouver (Wash.), U.S.
20. Detroit, U.S.
21. Port Arthur, Canada
22. Buffalo, U.S.
23. Hamilton, Canada
24. Orange (Tex.), U.S.
25. Corpus Christi, U.S.
26. Key West, U.S.
27. Jacksonville, U.S.
28. Cleveland, U.S.
29. Milwaukee, U.S.
30. Tampa, U.S.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 7 -

LIST IIC

ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF BASES FOR AIR MOBILE
OBSERVATION POSTS IN NATO COUNTRIES

1. Paris, France
2. The Hague, Netherlands
2. London, United Kingdom
4. Oslo, Norway
5. Copenhagen, Denmark
6. Rome, Italy
7. Ankara, Turkey
8. Athens, Greece


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIST IID


ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF POSTS AT U.S. AIR BASES

1. Castle
2. Loring
3. Walker
4. Westover
5. Carswell
6. Altus
7. Amarillo
8. Barksdale
9. Beale
10. Bergstrom
11. Biggs
12. Blytheville
13. Clinton-Sherman
14. Columbus
15. Dow
16. Dyess
17. Eglin
18. Ellsworth
19. Fairchild
20. Slasgow

~~SECRET~~



AN ILLUSTRATIVE SYSTEM OF OBSERVATION POSTS IN THE SOVIET UNION




AN ILLUSTRATIVE SYSTEM OF OBSERVATION POSTS IN EUROPEAN NATO COUNTRIES

LEGEND

- △ Group A Border Barrier
- Group B Supplementary Transportation Centers
- ★ Group C Operating Base for Air Mobile Teams
- Group D Strategic Airfields



AN ILLUSTRATIVE SYSTEM OF OBSERVATION POSTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA



~~SECRET~~

This document consists
of pages.

No. of copies,
Series

ANNEX B

LOCATIONS OF OBSERVATION POSTS
IN SOVIET BLOC TERRITORY

PURPOSE

The purpose of this enclosure is to rank in order of priority proposed locations for observation posts in Soviet Bloc territory, and to explain the rationale as well as the relationship to the original lists in JCSM-773-63. The more extensive lists and more detailed information contained in this annex are intended to provide a basis for flexibility in the US position which cannot be shown in a single illustrative list.

1. Observation of Ground Forces

In order to decide where to locate a limited number of observation posts in Soviet Bloc territory, it is useful to note the present deployment of Soviet Bloc troops (bearing in mind that these troop deployments may be altered in the future). From the deployment figures shown in Annex C, it appears that the greatest ground-force threat to Western Europe lies with the troops presently stationed within the USSR itself.

The most useful locations for observation posts to provide the earliest warning of sudden large-scale reinforcements moving out of the Soviet Union, would be posts located near the western border of the USSR. About 17 observation posts, if properly located, could monitor all rail traffic, and much of the high-way traffic, across the border. Most of the ground-force movement would be by rail, since the available road, air and water transport capabilities in this region are small in comparison with that of the railroads.

The usefulness of these border observation posts would be enhanced if they were located at the transloading sites where the rail gage changes from the wider tracks in the Soviet Union to the narrower ones in the Satellite countries. Observation posts at these transloading sites could provide not only data on the volume of rail traffic, but also information

GROUP 3

~~SECRET~~

Downgraded at 12-year
intervals; not auto-

-2-

on its nature. In moving freight between the lines of different gages, the predominant method consists of unloading boxes from one freight car and placing them in another. This is usually accomplished manually. For heavy and bulky loads, cranes are used. For certain through passenger trains and special freight cars, the wheel trucks are changed by jacking the car free of its trucks, rolling them clear, and replacing them with trucks of the other gage.

Most of the rail lines crossing the border have several transloading sites on both the USSR side and on the Western side of the border. Since there are 50 transloading sites altogether, it probably would not be wise to establish an observation post at every transloading site. It seems more appropriate to give the observers at a single site responsibility for monitoring operations at other sites on the same rail line. All the rail lines can be monitored with posts at only 17 sites.

Supplementary observation posts at key rail centers, highway centers and seaports would also be very useful in monitoring military movements in the Soviet Bloc. The various lists of post locations to be found at the end of this discussion are arranged to facilitate selecting appropriate groups of observation post locations to fit various agreements which might be negotiated.

The first priority posts in List A contain 17 highest-priority transportation centers. These are the transloading stations which cover all the railway lines, and many of the major highways, crossing the western border of the USSR. The list is based upon Page 22 of JCSM-773-63, with the following modifications:

1. Transloading stations were chosen rather than non-transloading sites on each rail line.
2. About half of the sites were chosen on the Satellite side of the border, on the assumption that the total number of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-3-

available posts in the USSR will probably be limited. (It would be feasible and acceptable to substitute other posts on either side of the border, as desired.)

3. The primary purpose of this group of posts is to "seal" the border. Thus, certain posts listed in JCSM-773-63 which are not required to monitor rail movement across the border were moved to List B (such as Baronovichi, Lutsk, and Kishinev).

The first 17 posts in List A are arranged in geographical order, rather than in order of priority. They should be considered as an indivisible group, since (a) "sealing" the border requires all these posts, or acceptable substitutes, and (b) it can be assumed that these 17 posts could be agreed upon if any agreement can be reached at all.

The preferred Western position should be an agreement to permit observers to visit at will the associated transloading stations along the same railway line. These associated transloading stations are listed in the second column. If this degree of mobility cannot be negotiated, however, the 17 primary stations in List 1 would still be able to monitor all trains crossing the western border of the USSR. In any case, the agreement should specify that whenever a new railroad line is built across the border in such a way that existing posts do not monitor it, an additional post or posts will be established on the new line as required.

All the attached lists of posts are so arranged that they can also be used as building blocks from which various packages of posts can be put together readily. These post locations and their priority rankings are generally those recommended in JCSM-773-63. For convenience of reference, the JCSM page number is given for each location. All the JCSM locations are included, plus a few additional locations, the reasons for which are explained in footnotes. Where tankings are not given in JCSM-773-63, they have been supplied on the basis of the rationale discussed in this paper.

In general, emphasis has been placed on posts in major cities in the western region of the USSR, the region in which there is the greatest concentration of Soviet ground forces.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-4-

List B contains additional transportation centers arranged in order of priority, so that a negotiator can select the best ones to use to fit any agreed total number. This list is divided into two parts: A primary list based on the assumption that observation posts for air mobility would provide air surveillance and a secondary or alternate list which can be used if air surveillance cannot be negotiated.

List C contains 5 locations of bases for area-mobile teams in the Satellite territories, and 14 locations for similar bases in the territory of the Soviet Union.

List D consists of groups of airfields of priority I, II and III, respectively. The size of each list corresponds approximately to the numbers of airfields in JCSM-773-63 under Tabs B, A and C, respectively. The rationale for airfield selection and additional data on the importance of each airfield is contained in Section 2 below.

The arrangement of the various post locations into separate lists with priority groupings was made to facilitate their use in Annex A.

2. Observation Posts at Airfields and Missile Bases

JCSM-773-63 divides air bases into two general categories: a) Long-range air force home and staging bases, and b) light and medium bomber and tactical air bases. Although this breakdown is convenient for purposes of analysis, the two groups are interdependent.

The JCS preferred list (Tab A of Annex A of JCSM 773-63) includes 22 air bases (five heavy bomber home bases and 17 medium bomber and/or staging bases). The minimum list (Tab B of Annex A of JCSM-773) contains the same air bases as the preferred list, except for the elimination of 8 medium bomber and staging bases, for a total of 14 air bases. Tab C of Annex A of JCSM-773, which is based upon no air surveillance, includes all the long-range bases of Tabs A and B plus 19 additional medium bomber and/or staging bases for a total of 41 long-range bases.

~~SECRET~~

-5-

Except to the extent that medium bombers are associated with long-range air force bases listed in Tabs A and B, the JCS recommend OP's at medium and light bomber bases and tactical bases only in Tab C where no wide area mobility is assumed. These bases are divided into two priorities: All Priority I bases (7 in number) are in the USSR. The Priority II listing contains 37 bases in the USSR and 10 Soviet bases in the satellite countries, 4 in Hungary and 6 in Poland. At Annex B is a tabulation of the medium and light bomber bases and tactical bases mentioned by the JCS indicating their priorities, the countries in which they are located, and their TDI categories.

In addition to the bases mentioned by the JCS, this Annex lists other Soviet-occupied bases in the Satellites, including those in East Germany at the end of List D. The latter are included to illustrate the posts omitted in East Germany.

Soviet Bloc airfields are tabulated in List D. Priority I contains 15 top-priority airfields. Priority II contains 20 airfields of lesser priority, and Priority III contains 61 airfields of third priority.

~~SECRET~~

-6-

SUMMARY OF LISTS OF OBSERVATION POST
LOCATIONS IN SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES

<u>LIST</u>	<u>Page</u>
<u>Border Barrier Posts</u>	
A	8
17 of Priority I	8
7 of Priority II	
<u>Supplementary Transportation Centers</u>	
B	9
20 of Priority I	9-10
49 of Priority I-A	10
42 of Priority II-A	
<u>Bases for Air Surveillance Teams</u>	
C	11
5 of Type I	11
14 of Type II	
<u>Airfields</u>	
D	12
15 of Priority I	12-13
20 of Priority II	13-14
61 of Priority III	15
21 Air Bases in Germany	

SECRET

-7-

DISTRIBUTION OF OBSERVATION POSTS BY LOCATIONNATO OP's in Warsaw Pact Countries

<u>List</u>	A		B			C		D			
<u>Priority</u>	I	II	I	IA	IIA	I	II	I	II	III	Germany
<u>Country</u>											
USSR	9	7	11	26	20	-	14	15	34	36	-
Poland	6	-	4	5	6	1	-	-	6	-	-
Rumania	2	-	-	4	5	1	-	-	-	-	-
Czechoslovakia	-	-	3	6	4	1	-	-	-	-	-
Hungary	-	-	2	2	4	1	-	-	5	-	-
Bulgaria	-	-	1	6	3	1	-	-	-	-	-
E. Germany	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22
<u>Total</u>	17	7	21	49	42	5	14	15	45	36	22
<u>Grand Total</u>	17	24				5	19	15	60	96	118

~~SECRET~~

-8-

LIST A

ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF TRANSPORTATION CENTERS
CONSTITUTING A BORDER "BARRIER" IN SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES

<u>Primary Post</u>	<u>Associated Transloading Stations</u>	<u>Priority</u>
1. Kaliningrad, USSR	Braniewo, Chrusciel, Bartoszyce	I
2. Skandawa, Poland	Chernyakhovsk, Krasnovka, Mozyr	"
	Novyy, Zheleznodorozhniy	"
3. Suwalki, Poland	Trakizsi, Novo Moskava,	"
	Sheshtokay	"
4. Sokolka, Poland	Grodno, Losos'na, Kuznica,	"
	Czarna Wies	"
5. Berestovitsa, USSR	None	"
6. Narewka, Poland	Svisloch	"
7. Brest, USSR	Zhabinka, Terespol, Malaszewicze	"
8. Dorohusk, Poland	Kovel, East Yagodin, Grochonek,	"
	Chelm, Zawadowka	"
9. Rava-Russkaya, USSR	None	"
10. Medyka, Poland	Mostiska, Rodnia Wola, Hurko	"
	Zurawica	"
11. Sambor, USSR	None	"
12. Chop, USSR	Cerna, Zahony, Tuzser, Komoro	"
13. Mukachevo, USSR	Halmeu	"
14. Sighet, Rumania	None	"
15. Dornesti, Rumania	Radauti	"
16. Ungeny, USSR	Holboca, Nicolina, Iasi	"
17. Reni, USSR	Galati	"
18. Armavir, USSR	None	II
19. Astrakhan, USSR	None	"
20. Leningrad, USSR	None	"
21. Tallin, USSR	None	"
22. Riga, USSR	None	"
23. Petrozavodsk, USSR	None	"
24. Kandalaksha, USSR	None	"

SECRET

-9-

LIST BILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF SUPPLEMENTARY TRANSPORTATION CENTERS*

<u>City & Country</u>	<u>a/</u>	<u>b/</u>	<u>City & Country</u>	<u>a/</u>	<u>b/</u>
1. Kiev, USSR	I	25	13. Olsztyn, Poland	I	16-17
2. Minsk, USSR	I	25	14. Szczecin, Poland	I	16-17
3. Lvov, USSR	I	25	15. Deblin, Poland	I	16-17
4. Shyauliyay, USSR	I	16-17	16. Trencin,		
5. Polotsk, USSR	I	16-17	Czechoslovakia	I	16-17
6. Kalinkovichi, USSR	I	16-17	17. Bratislava, Czech.	I	16-17
7. Korosten, USSR	I	16-17	18. Kosice, Czech.	I	16-17
8. Kazatin, USSR	I	16-17	19. Szekesfehervar,		
9. Zhmerinka, USSR	I	16-17	Hungary	I	16-17
10. Slobodka, USSR	I	16-17	20. Gyor, Hungary	I	16-17
11. Osipovichi, USSR	I	16-17			
12. Bialystok, Poland	I	16-17			
1. Kiev, USSR	I-A	25	17. Vladivostok, USSR		
2. Minsk, USSR	I-A	25	(port)	I-A	36
3. Lvov, USSR	I-A	25	18. Pechenga, USSR		
4. Ulan Ude, USSR	I-A	23	(port)	I-A	36
5. Zhmerinka, USSR	I-A	25	19. Baronovichi, USSR	I-A	22
6. Sovetsk, USSR	I-A	25	20. Lutsk, USSR	I-A	22
7. Vilnius, USSR	I-A	25	21. Kishinev, USSR	I-A	22
8. Ternopol, USSR	I-A	25	22. Chardzhov, USSR	I-A	Note 3**
9. Rovno, USSR	I-A	25	23. Tashkent, USSR	I-A	Note 3**
10. Warsaw, Poland	I-A	27	24. Baku, USSR	I-A	Note 1**
11. Prague, Czech.	I-A	27	25. Tbilisi, USSR	I-A	Note 1**
12. Budapest, Hungary	I-A	27	26. Trencin,		
13. Bucharest, Rumania	I-A	27	Czechoslovakia	I-A	27
14. Sofia, Bulgaria	I-A	27	27. Zilina, Czech.	I-A	Note 4**
15. Murmansk, USSR			28. Breclav, Czech.	I-A	Note 4**
(port)	I-A	36	29. Slutsk, USSR	I-A	25
16. Petropavlovsk,			30. Molodechno, USSR	I-A	25
USSR (port)	I-A	36	31. Shyauliyay, USSR	I-A	25

(Continued)

a/ Priority.

b/ Page of JCSM-773-63.

* Arranged in approximate order of priority. Priority I-A and II-A represent alternates which could be used if air mobile posts cannot be negotiated.

** Notes are on Page 16.

SECRET

-10-

LIST B (Continued)

<u>City & Country</u>	<u>a/</u>	<u>b/</u>	<u>City & Country</u>	<u>a/</u>	<u>b/</u>
32. Korosten, USSR	I-A	25	65. Slobodka, USSR	II-A	25
33. Polotsk, USSR	I-A	25	66. Razdel' Naya, USSR	II-A	25
34. Kalinkovichi, USSR	I-A	25	67. Klaypeda, USSR	II-A	25
35. Constanta, Rumania	I-A	*Note 5	68. Yokanga, USSR	II-A	36
36. Burgas, Bulgaria	I-A	" " "	69. Zaliv Vladimira, USSR	II-A	36
37. Varna, Bulgaria	I-A	27	70. Kecskemet, Hungary	II-A	27
38. Deblin, Poland	I-A	27	71. Szczecin, Poland	II-A	27
39. Gdynia/Danzig, Poland	I-A	36	72. Kosice, Czech.	II-A	27
40. Bialystok, Poland	I-A	27	73. Bazau, Rumania	II-A	27
41. Bratislava, Czechoslovakia	I-A	27	74. Gara Zlati Dol, Bulgaria	II-A	27
42. Cluj, Rumania	I-A	27	75. Gyor, Hungary	II-A	27
43. Plovdiv, Bulgaria	I-A	27	76. Prezeworsk, Poland	II-A	27
44. Sockesfehervar, Hungary	I-A	27	77. Ostrava, Czech.	II-A	27
45. Olsztyn, Poland	I-A	27	78. Ploesti, Rumania	II-A	27
46. Tabor, Czech.	I-A	27	79. Stara Zogora, Bulgaria	II-A	27
47. Brasov, Rumania	I-A	27	80. Kaposvar, Hungary	II-A	27
48. Gorna Oryakhovitsa, Bulgaria	I-A	27	81. Elblag, Poland	II-A	27
49. Turnovo, Bulgaria	I-A	16-17	82. Zvolen, Czech.	II-A	27
50. Tarskiy, USSR	II-A	23	83. Satu Mare, Rumania	II-A	27
51. Ussuriysk, USSR	II-A	23	84. Sliven, Bulgaria	II-A	27
52. Khabarovsk, USSR	II-A	23	85. Szeged, Hungary	II-A	27
53. Daugavpils, USSR	II-A	25	86. Pilawa, Poland	II-A	27
54. Shipetovka, USSR	II-A	25	87. Presov, Czech.	II-A	27
55. Zhlobin, USSR	II-A	25	88. Beclean, Rumania	II-A	27
56. Orsha, USSR	II-A	25	89. Poznan, Poland	II-A	27
57. Vitebsk, USSR	II-A	25	90. Legnica, Poland	II-A	27
58. Mogilev, USSR	II-A	25	91. Ciceu, Rumania	II-A	27
59. Kazatin, USSR	II-A	25			
60. Osipovich, USSR	II-A	25			
61. Fastov, USSR	II-A	25			
62. Sarny, USSR	II-A	25			
63. Luninets, USSR	II-A	25			
64. Lida, USSR	II-A	25			

*Notes are on page 16.

~~SECRET~~

-11-

LIST CILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF BASES FOR
AIR MOBILE OBSERVATION TEAMS IN
SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES AND USSR

<u>City & Country</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Page of</u> <u>JCSM-773-63</u>
1. Prague, Czechoslovakia	I	14
2. Budapest, Hungary	I	14
3. Bucharest, Rumania	I	14
4. Warsaw, Poland	I	14
5. Sophia, Bulgaria	I	14
6. Brest, USSR	II	14
7. Irkutsk, USSR	II	14
8. Khabarovsk, USSR	II	14
9. Kiev, USSR	II	14
10. Leningrad, USSR	II	14
11. Lvov, USSR	II	14
12. Moscow, USSR	II	14
13. Murmansk, USSR	II	14
14. Odessa, USSR	II	14
15. Petropavlovsk, USSR	II	14
16. Rostov, USSR	II	14
17. Tbilisi, USSR	II	14
18. Vilnius, USSR	II	14
19. Vladivostok, USSR	II	14

~~SECRET~~

LIST D

-12-

ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF POSTS AT SOVIET BLOC AIR BASES

<u>Name - Country</u>	<u>Prior-ity</u>	<u>Type Base</u>	<u>Probable Supplementary Use</u>
1. Dolon, USSR	I	Heavy Bomber Home Base	
2. Engels, USSR	I	" " " "	
3. Ukraina, USSR	I	" " " "	
4. Chepelevka, USSR	I	" " " "	
5.*Siauliai, USSR	I	" " " "	
6. Olenegorsk, USSR	I	Medium Bomber Home Base	Heavy Bomber
7. Anadyr/Levinka, USSR	I	" " " "	" "
8.*Baranovichi, USSR	I	" " " "	-
9.*Ussuriysk			
Vozdvizhenka, USSR	I	" " " "	-
10. Mozdok, USSR	I	" " " "	-
11. Tartu, USSR	I	" " " "	-
12. Karankut, USSR	I	" " " "	-
13. Starokonstantinov, USSR	I	Light Bomber Home Base	Light Jet Bomber
14. Tbilisi/Vaziani, USSR	I	Offensive Fighter Home Base	" " "
15.*Chernyakhovsk, USSR	I	Light Bomber Home Base	" " "
16. Gomel/Pribytki, USSR	II	Medium Bomber Home Base	-
17. Zavitsinsk Northeast, USSR	II	Long-Range Bomber Capable Base (Active)	Piston Transport
18.*Belaya/Tserkov, USSR	II	Medium Bomber Home Base	-
19. Poltava, USSR	II	" " " "	-
20.*Petrovsk/Yelizovo, USSR	II	" " " "	-
21. Mys Shmidt, USSR	II	Primary Staging Home Base	Heavy Bomber
22. Tiksi, USSR	II	" " " "	-
23. Bobruysk, USSR	II	Medium Bomber Home Base	-
24. Priluki, USSR	II	" " " "	-
25.*Stry, USSR	II	" " " "	-
26.*Shchuchin, USSR	II	Light Bomber Home Base	Light Jet Bomber
27. Sarabuz, USSR	II	Medium Bomber Home Base	-
28. Bereza, USSR	II	Light Bomber Home Base	Light Jet Bomber
29. Oktyabrskoye, USSR	II	Medium Bomber Home Base	-
30. Krustpils, USSR	II	Light Bomber Home Base	-
31. Kalinin, USSR	II	Medium Bomber Home Base	-

*Collocated with other observation posts.

SECRET

LIST D (Cont'd)

-13-

Name - Country	Prior- ity	Type Base	Probable Supplementary Use
32. Briyeni, USSR	II	Medium Bomber Home Base	-
33. Dallyar, USSR	II	Light Bomber Home Base	-
34. Zhitomir/ Skomorokhi, USSR	II	Medium Bomber Home Base	-
35. Limanskoye, USSR	II	Light Bomber Home Base	-
36. Bykhov	III	Medium Bomber Home Base	Heavy Bomber
37. Soltsy	III	" " " "	" "
38. *Minsk/Machulishche	III	" " " "	-
39. *Oesha Southwest	III	" " " "	-
40. Anisovo Gorodishche	III	" " " "	-
41. Khorol East	III	" " " "	-
42. Melitopol	III	" " " "	-
43. Mirgorod	III	" " " "	-
44. Nezhin	III	" " " "	-
45. Ryazan/Dyagilevo	III	" " " "	-
46. Spassk Dalniy East	III	" " " "	-
47. Belaya	III	" " " "	-
48. Ostrov/Gorokhovka	III	" " " "	Heavy Bomber
49. Aspidnoye	III	Light Bomber Home Base	-
50. Dorzya-North West	III	Light Bomber Home Base	Medium Bomber
51. Sredniy	III	" " " "	-
52. Vorkuta-East	III	" " " "	-
53. **Alekseyevka	III	Medium Bomber Home Base	-
54. Arkhangelsk/Kholm	III	" " " "	-
55. Pochinok	III	Light Bomber Home Base	Medium Bomber
56. Artem North	III	Medium Bomber Home Base	-
57. *Kaliningrad/ Proveron	III	" " " "	-
58. *Mal Yavr	III	" " " "	-
59. **Romanovka West	III	" " " "	-
60. Saki	III	" " " "	-
61. *Severomorsk	III	" " " "	-
62. #Luchki	III	Light Bomber Home Base	-
63. **Nikolayevka	III	" " " "	-
64. Blagoyevo	III	" " " "	Light Jet Bomber
65. #Pergana	III	" " " "	" " "
66. *Gorodok	III	" " " "	" " "
67. Kolomyia	III	" " " "	" " "
68. Krechevitsy	III	" " " "	" " "
69. Monchegorsk	III	" " " "	" " "

Airfields located in Far Eastern USSR.

*Collocated with other observation posts.

LIST D (Cont'd)

Name - Country	Prior-ity	Type Base	Probable Supplementary Use
70. Panevezys	III	Light Bomber Home Base	Light Jet Bomber
71. Postavy	III	" " " "	" " "
72. *Riga West	III	" " " "	" " "
73. Samtredia East	III	" " " "	" " "
74. Gura Kyanari	III	Offensive Fighter Home Base	" " "
75. Kirovobad	III	" " "	" " "
76. #Novorossiia	III	" " "	" " "
77. **Osinovka	III	" " "	" " "
78. Parnu	III	Long-Range Capable Base (Not Active)	" " "
79. Voznesensk	III	Offensive Fighter H.B.	" " "
80. *Riga/Kumbola	III	" " " "	All-weather Fighter
81. *Ros	III	" " " "	" " "
82. Khanskaya	III	Long-Range Capable Base (Not Active)	" " "
83. Makharadze	III	Offensive Fighter Home Base	Day Fighter
84. *Odessa Central	III	Long-Range Capable Base (Not active)	Light Jet Bomber
85. Tiraspol	III	Offensive Fighter Home Base	Day Fighter
<u>HUNGARY</u>			
86. *Kiskunlachaza	III	" " "	-
87. Kunmadaras	III	" " "	Light Jet Bomber
88. *Budapest/Tokol	III	" " "	All-Weather Ftr.
89. Sarmellek	III	" " "	" " "
90. **Debrecen	III	Light Bomber Home Base	Light Jet Bomber
<u>POLAND</u>			
91. Brieg	III	Light Bomber Home Base	-
92. Aslau	III	Offensive Fighter Home Base	Light Jet Bomber
93. Stargard	III	" " "	-
94. Zagan	III	" " "	All-Weather Ftr.
95. *Konigsberg/ Neumark	III	" " "	Day Fighter
96. **Sprottau	III	" " "	All-Weather Ftr.

Airfields located in Far Eastern USSR.

* Collocated with other observation posts.

**These two airfields were not in the JCSM list, but do have Soviet forces

~~SECRET~~

-15-

LIST D (Cont'd)

<u>Name - Country</u>	<u>Type Base</u>	<u>Probable Supplementary Use</u>
97. Briesen, Germany	Light Bomber Home Base	Light Jet Bomber
98. Finow, Germany	" " " "	" " "
99. Parchin, Germany	" " " "	" " "
100. Stendel, Germany	" " " "	" " "
101. Werneuchen, Germany	" " " "	" " "
102. Welzow, Germany	" " " "	" " "
103. Gross Dolln, Germany	Offensive Ftr. "	" " "
104. Juterbog, Germany	" " " "	" " "
105. Putnitz, Germany	" " " "	" " "
106. Alt. Lannowitz, Germany	" " " "	All-Weather Ftr.
107. Grossehain, Germany	" " " "	" " "
108. Kothen, Germany	" " " "	" " "
109. Merseburg, Germany	" " " "	" " "
110. Rechlin/Larz, Germany	" " " "	" " "
111. Altenberg, Germany	" " " "	Day Fighter
112. Finsterwalde, Germany	" " " "	" "
113. Neuruppin, Germany	" " " "	" "
114. Wittstock, Germany	" " " "	-
115. Zerst, Germany	" " " "	-
116. Kammersdorf, Germany	Long-Range Bomber Capable Base (Active)	Piston Transport
117. Orienburg, Germany	Long-Range Bomber Capable Base (Active)	Light Jet Bomber
118. Brandis, Germany	Long-Range Bomber Capable Base (Not Active)	Day Fighter

~~SECRET~~

NOTES FOR LISTS OF POST LOCATIONS

- Note 1 Locations A-18, A-19, B-24, and B-25 (alternate B List) were added to cover rail lines leading to the Turkish border.
- Note 2 Locations A-20, A-21, and A-22 are three Baltic ports which might be used to bypass the rail observation posts along the USSR border.
- Note 3 Locations B-22 and B-23 (alternate B List) were added to cover rail lines leading toward the Middle East countries.
- Note 4 Locations B-26, B-27 and B-28 (alternate B List) can monitor all rail traffic between Hungary and Poland which does not enter Austria or the USSR. (The border posts in List A monitor the traffic which goes via the USSR.)
- Note 5 Locations B-35, B-36 and B-37 are three Black Sea ports which might be used to bypass the rail observation posts along the USSR border.

~~SECRET~~

ANNEX C

SOVIET BLOC OBSERVATION POSTS IN NATO COUNTRIES

INTRODUCTION

The following discussion and illustrative listings of potential locations of Soviet Bloc posts in the NATO area are set forth primarily as an aid to planning within NATO. They are not intended as a list which we would offer the Soviets since we must expect that they will be prepared to state their own requirements. Stated Soviet requirements would then be referred to NATO for consideration and approval by the countries concerned.

Soviet priorities for observation posts in the NATO area are likely to differ substantially from ours in the Soviet Bloc. Beyond this we can only speculate about specific Soviet OP requirements. Accordingly, no effort has been made to analyze anticipated Soviet requirements in detail, and the listing shown represents almost a mirror image of our own concerns. We shall want to insist on maintaining overall reciprocity, but we should not insist that they select the same number of posts of each type as we do.

THREATS OF PROBABLE CONCERN TO THE SOVIETS

Hence, starting with the premise that Soviet military concern generally parallel those of the NATO countries, but with different emphasis and priorities because of (1) geographical differences, (2) political differences between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and (3) differences in current military capabilities, several lists of OP's have been prepared. These OP's would be intended to provide the Soviets with significant and timely information regarding several types of military threats:

1. The Ground Threat

- a. Provide warning of a dangerous Western response to interference with the Berlin corridors, or of a Western intent to capitalize on a Soviet Bloc crisis.
- b. Provide indications of a gradual build-up of Western forces in Europe or Germany.

This document consists of
44 pages. Number 3 of 4
copies. Series C.

SECRET

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not auto-
matically declassified.

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

- c. Provide more reliable indication of a rapid large-scale reinforcement of Western Forces.

2. The Tactical Air Threat (European Based)

Provide warning of a Western tactical air initiative in a crisis, or limited conflict situation.

3. The Strategic Threat (U.S. Based)

Provide warning of impending U.S. nuclear response.

Broadly speaking, the Soviets can already obtain warning quite reliably of threats 1-a and 1-c from open sources and available intelligence. However, their information concerning threat 1-a may be comparatively inadequate. Thus, one can expect that the Soviets will be more interested in observers with troop units in Germany and less interested in barrier type posts than the West. The comparative adequacy of their information on normal or routine Western operations should also lead them to be more interested in posts at rail and road centers on the Continent, that would be involved in a quick response, than in U.S. or European posts associated with slower transatlantic operations.

The relative strength of the Soviet army compared to NATO ground forces will probably lead them to be much more concerned about NATO nuclear responses than about any action by NATO ground forces. Thus, they may place greater emphasis on monitoring airbases than transportation centers.

It is quite likely that a preferred list of OP's for the Soviet Bloc would include many U.S. strategic air bases and very few, if any, U.S. ports or rail centers. In Europe their main interest would probably be the observers with troop units and rail and road centers feeding toward the point of contact between East and West.

While these differences in emphasis seem probable, one cannot be sure of Soviet objectives. In these circumstances it would be appropriate for us to indicate initially that we assume they will

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

be interested in a system of posts roughly symmetrical with that which we want in their area. Nevertheless, because of geographical and military differences between East and West, it is not appropriate to try to make the lists of posts match in precise detail.

RATIONALE OF ILLUSTRATIVE POST SELECTION

To deal with any Soviet concern with a build-up of military troops and equipment either inside or just outside of Germany, the "group A" OP's for the Warsaw Pact include a set of eleven rail junctions just outside of Germany, along with the three largest ports of the Federal Republic. Together, these fourteen transportation centers form the Priority I posts of List A.

List A also contains nine United States and two Canadian port complexes. The United States port complexes include all those with a general cargo handling capacity greater than 50,000 long tons a day, and together make up almost 70% of the general cargo handling capacity of the United States. The two Canadian ports are the largest in the East and in the West. By having (Warsaw Pact) observation posts in these eleven port complexes, any secret movement of military supplies from the United States to our NATO allies would have to be loaded in our smaller ports. While a military build-up in Europe using our smaller ports would not be impossible, it would be more difficult, more time-consuming, and easier to detect by unilateral means.

List B contains a main list and an alternate list. The main list contains transportation centers of sufficient importance such that a permanent observation post is warranted even when air surveillance is available. This list is intended to be used if such air mobility is negotiable.

In Europe these posts supplement the barrier posts near the German border with a capability to monitor major ports where armaments might be delivered to the Continent. In the United States these posts extend the system of port surveillance to provide better coverage of shipping facilities. With this group of port complexes added to the first group, almost 90% of the general cargo handling capacity of the United States would be covered by OP's.

SECRET

- 4 -

The alternate list is based on the assumption that air surveillance cannot be negotiated. This list is substantially longer since the absence of aerial surveillance makes the job more difficult. Again, principle ports are the main objects of observation. Geographically, the area monitored is extended to include the U.K., Norway, and Denmark in the Priority I portion of this list. In addition more U.S. ports are included to limit various routes by which armed forces and equipment could be shipped over to Europe without being monitored, and almost 96% of the general cargo handling capacity of the United States would be covered.

The second priority portion of this alternate list extends coverage to almost all major U.S. and European ports. It also extends coverage to some major rail centers in Europe.

List C (bases for air surveillance teams) contains ten posts in the United States and eight in NATO Europe. Those in the U.S. are placed in or near major urban areas and are so distributed over the country that they should provide adequate aerial coverage. In Europe the eight bases are all national capitals in analogy with the approach used in the Satellites. However, to limit the list, not all NATO capitals have been listed. For example, there seems to be no real need for aerial surveillance in Iceland or Portugal, while in the Lowlands one post should be adequate.

List D contains NATO airbases. The first priority list includes 20 major U.S. bases. This is more than the 15 in the corresponding U.S. list, on the assumption that the Soviets would place greater emphasis on air bases. The 37 bases in the first and second priority lists include all B-52 bases in the U.S.

The third priority section of this list tabulates the NATO air bases that are equipped with attack squadrons. The list starts with the British V Bomber squadrons and the U.S. bases in the U.K. These are followed by France, the low countries, Germany, Scandinavia, Italy, Turkey and Greece in that order, with foreign bases generally associated with those of the host country.

The fourth priority group contains U.S. medium bomber bases.

~~SECRET~~

0. 00000

- 5 -

SUMMARY OF LISTS OF OBSERVATION POST LOCATIONS
IN NATO COUNTRIES

LIST

PAGE

- A 14 Border Barrier Posts, Priority I
- 11 U.S. and Canadian Port Complexes, Priority II

- B 20 European, U.S. and Canadian Ports, Priority I
- 34 European, U.S. and Canadian Ports, Priority I-A
- 37 European Ports and Rail Centers, Priority II-A
- 20 U.S. and Canadian Ports, Priority II-A

- C 10 U.S. Bases for Mobile Teams, Type I
- 8 European Bases for Mobile Teams, Type II

- D 20 U.S. Airfields, Priority I
- 17 U.S. Airfields, Priority II
- 53 European Airfields, Priority III
- 11 U.S. Airfields, Priority IV

~~SECRET~~

- 6 -

DISTRIBUTION OF OBSERVATION POSTS BY LOCATION

Warsaw Pact OP's in NATO Countries

	List A		B		C		D					
	Priority	I	II	I	IA	IIA	I	II	I	II	III	IV
<u>Country</u>												
France	4	-	2	3	11	1	-	-	-	4	--	
Luxembourg	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Belgium	1	-	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	
Netherlands	4	-	2	2	2	1	-	-	-	2	-	
Denmark	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	2	-	
Norway	-	-	-	1	3	1	-	-	-	3	-	
United Kingdom	-	-	3	3	5	1	-	-	-	11	-	
German Fed. Rep.	3	-	1	1	3	-	-	-	-	16	-	
Italy	-	-	-	-	6	1	-	-	-	3	-	
Greece	-	-	-	-	3	1	-	-	-	4	-	
Turkey	-	-	-	-	3	1	-	-	-	6	-	
U.S.	-	9	10	18	16	-	10	20	17	-	11	
Canada	-	2	-	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	
<u>TOTAL</u>	14	11	20	34	57	8	10	20	17	53	11	
<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>	14	25	20	34	91		18	20	37	90	101	

~~SECRET~~

- 7 -

LIST A

ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF TRANSPORTATION CENTERS FOR MONITORING
MILITARY TRAFFIC INTO THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

<u>Observation Post</u>	<u>Priority</u>
1. Mulhouse, France	I
2. Strasbourg, France	I
3. Nancy, France	I
4. Metz, France	I
5. Luxembourg, Luxembourg	I
6. Liege, Belgium	I
7. Endhoven, Netherlands	I
8. Arnhem, Netherlands	I
9. Zwolle, Netherlands	I
10. Groningen, Netherlands	I
11. Tinglev, Denmark	I
12. Hamburg, Germany	I
13. Bremerhaven, Germany	I
14. Bremen, Germany	I
15. New York, U.S.	II
16. Norfolk, Newport News, U.S.	II
17. San Francisco, Alameda, Oakland, Richmond, Mare Island, U.S.	II
18. Philadelphia, U.S.	II
19. New Orleans, U.S.	II
20. Baltimore, U.S.	II
21. Boston, U.S.	II
22. Long Beach, Los Angeles, U.S.	II
23. Seattle, Tacoma, Bremerton, U.S.	II
24. Montreal, Canada	II
25. Vancouver, Canada	II

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

LIST B

- 8 -

ILLUSTRATIVE LISTS OF SUPPLEMENTARY TRANSPORTATION CENTERS

<u>City and Country</u>	<u>Priority</u>
1. Marseille, France	I
2. Bordeaux, France	I
3. Antwerp, Belgium	I
4. Brussels, Belgium	I
5. Rotterdam, Netherlands	I
6. Amsterdam, Netherlands	I
7. Kiel, Germany	I
8. Bristol, U.K.	I
9. Liverpool, U.K.	I
10. Portsmouth, U.K.	I
11. Charleston, U.S.	I
12. Duluth, Superior, U.S.	I
13. Chicago, U.S.	I
14. Houston, U.S.	I
15. Galveston, U.S.	I
16. Mobile, U.S.	I
17. Savannah, U.S.	I
18. San Diego, U.S.	I
19. Portland (Ore.), Vancouver (Wash.), U.S.	I
20. Detroit, U.S.	I
1. Marseille, France	IA
2. Bordeaux, France	IA
3. Antwerp, Belgium	IA
4. Brussels, Belgium	IA
5. Rotterdam, Netherlands	IA
6. Amsterdam, Netherlands	IA
7. Kiel, Germany	IA
8. Bristol, U.K.	IA
9. Liverpool, U.K.	IA
10. Portsmouth, U.K.	IA
11. LeHavre, France	IA
12. Ghent, Belgium	IA
13. Oslo, Norway	IA
14. Copenhagen, Denmark	IA
15. Charleston, U.S.	IA
16. Duluth, Superior, U.S.	IA
17. Chicago, U.S.	IA
18. Houston, U.S.	IA
19. Galveston, U.S.	IA
20. Mobile, U.S.	IA

SECRET

- 9 -

LIST B (Cont'd)

	<u>City and Country</u>	<u>Priority</u>
21.	Savannah, U.S.	IA
22.	San Diego, U.S.	IA
23.	Portland (Ore.), Vancouver (Wash.), U.S.	IA
24.	Detroit, U.S.	IA
25.	Port Arthur, Canada	IA
26.	Buffalo, U.S.	IA
27.	Hamilton, Canada	IA
28.	Orange (Tex.), U.S.	IA
29.	Corpus Christi, U.S.	IA
30.	Key West, U.S.	IA
31.	Jacksonville, U.S.	IA
32.	Cleveland, U.S.	IA
33.	Milwaukee, U.S.	IA
34.	Tampa, U.S.	IA
35.	Wilhelmshaven, Germany	IIA
36.	Glasgow, UK	IIA
37.	Bergen, Norway	IIA
38.	Aarhus, Denmark	IIA
39.	Rouen, France	IIA
40.	Paris, France	IIA
41.	Utrecht, Netherlands	IIA
42.	Lyon, France	IIA
43.	Reims, France	IIA
44.	Apeldoorn, Netherlands	IIA
45.	Myrdal, Norway	IIA
46.	Brest, France	IIA
47.	Toulon, France	IIA
48.	Emden, Germany	IIA
49.	Lubeck, Germany	IIA
50.	Plymouth, UK	IIA
51.	Southampton, UK	IIA
52.	Trondheim, Norway	IIA
53.	Genoa, Italy	IIA
54.	Naples, Italy	IIA
55.	Venice, Italy	IIA
56.	Dijon, France	IIA
57.	Amiens, France	IIA
58.	Dunkirk, France	IIA
59.	Cherbourg, France	IIA
60.	Belfast, UK	IIA

~~SECRET~~

LIST B (Cont'd)

- 10 -

	<u>City and Country</u>	<u>Priority</u>
61.	Cardiff, UK	IIA
62.	Rome, Italy	IIA
63.	Istanbul, Turkey	IIA
64.	Ankara, Turkey	IIA
65.	Athens, Greece	IIA
66.	Salonika, Greece	IIA
67.	Bologna, Italy	IIA
68.	Milan, Italy	IIA
69.	LeMans, France	IIA
70.	Piraives, Greece	IIA
71.	Izmir, Turkey	IIA
72.	Providence, R.I., U.S.	IIA
73.	Portland, Me., U.S.	IIA
74.	Pensacola, U.S.	IIA
75.	Sunny Point, N.C., U.S.	IIA
76.	Toledo, U.S.	IIA
77.	Brownsville, U.S.	IIA
78.	Stockton, Calif., U.S.	IIA
79.	Portsmouth, U.S.	IIA
80.	Lake Charles, U.S.	IIA
81.	Halifax, Canada	IIA
82.	Sault Ste. Marie, Canada	IIA
83.	Penn Manor, Pa., U.S.	IIA
84.	Port Arthur, Texas, U.S.	IIA
85.	Toronto, Canada	IIA
86.	Panama City, U.S.	IIA
87.	Wilmington, N.C., U.S.	IIA
88.	Quebec, Canada	IIA
89.	New London, Conn., U.S.	IIA
90.	Albany, N.Y., U.S.	IIA
91.	Aberdeen, Wash., U.S.	IIA

~~SECRET~~

- 11 -

LIST C

ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF BASES FOR AIR MOBILE OBSERVATION TEAMS IN
NATO COUNTRIES

	<u>City and Country</u>	<u>Type</u>
1.	Paris, France	I
2.	The Hague, Netherlands	I
3.	Oslo, Norway	I
4.	London, UK	I
5.	Copenhagen, Denmark	I
6.	Rome, Italy	I
7.	Ankara, Turkey	I
8.	Athens, Greece	I
9.	Albany, N.Y., U.S.	II
10.	Pittsburgh, U.S.	II
11.	Atlanta, U.S.	II
12.	St. Louis, U.S.	II
13.	Minneapolis/St. Paul, U.S.	II
14.	Dallas/Fort Worth, U.S.	II
15.	Denver, U.S.	II
16.	Miles City, Montana, U.S.	II
17.	Sacramento, U.S.	II
18.	Spokane, U.S.	II

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 12 -

LIST DILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF OBSERVATION POSTS AT U.S. AND
NATO AIR BASES

<u>Name - Country</u>	<u>Priority</u>
1. Castle AFB, U.S.	I
2. Loring AFB, U.S.	I
3. Walker AFB, U.S.	I
4. Westover AFB, U.S.	I
5. Carswell AFB, U.S.	I
6. Altus AFB, U.S.	I
7. Amarillo AFB, U.S.	I
8. Barksdale AFB, U.S.	I
9. Beale AFB, U.S.	I
10. Bergstrom AFB, U.S.	I
11. Biggs AFB, U.S.	I
12. Blytheville AFB, U.S.	I
13. Clinton-Sherman AFB, U.S.	I
14. Columbus AFB, U.S.	I
15. Dow AFB, U.S.	I
16. Dyess AFB, U.S.	I
17. Eglin AFB, U.S.	I
18. Ellsworth AFB, U.S.	I
19. Fairchild AFB, U.S.	I
20. Glasgow AFB, U.S.	I
21. Grand Forks AFB, U.S.	II
22. Griffiss AFB, U.S.	II
23. Homestead AFB, U.S.	II
24. K. I. Sawyer AFB, U.S.	II
25. Kincheloe AFB, U.S.	II
26. Larson AFB, U.S.	II
27. March AFB, U.S.	II
28. Mather AFB, U.S.	II
29. McCoy AFB, U.S.	II
30. Minot AFB, U.S.	II
31. Robins AFB, U.S.	II
32. Seymour AFB, U.S.	II
33. Sheppard AFB, U.S.	II
34. Travis AFB, U.S.	II
35. Turner AFB, U.S.	II
36. Wright-Patterson AFB, U.S.	II
37. Wurtsmith AFB, U.S.	II
38. Scampton, U.K.	III
39. Waddington, U.K.	III
40. Coningsby, U.K.	III

~~SECRET~~

LIST D (Cont'd)

- 13 -

<u>Name - Country</u>	<u>Priority</u>
41. Markham, U.K.	III
42. Cottlesmore, U.K.	III
43. Honington, U.K.	III
44. Wittering, U.K.	III
45. Wethersfield, U.S. (U.K.)	III
46. Woodbridge, U.S. (U.K.)	III
47. Lakenheath, U.S. (U.K.)	III
48. Bentwaters, U.S. (U.K.)	III
49. Kleine Brogel, Belgium	III
50. Florennes, Belgium	III
51. Volkel, Netherlands	III
52. Kindhoven, Netherlands	III
53. St. Dizier, France	III
54. Luxeuil, France	III
55. Metz, France	III
56. Nancy Oche, France	III
57. Bodo, Norway	III
58. Rugge, Norway	III
59. Orland, Norway	III
60. Karup, Denmark	III
61. Skrydstrup, Denmark	III
62. Husum, Germany	III
63. Buchel, Germany	III
64. Noervenich, Germany	III
65. Lechfeld, Germany	III
66. Memmingen, Germany	III
67. Hopsten, Germany	III
68. Bitberg, U.S. (Germany)	III
69. Spangdahlem, U.S. (Germany)	III
70. Hahn, U.S. (Germany)	III
71. Zweibrucken, Canada (Germany)	III
72. Geilenkirchen, U.K. (Germany)	III
73. Laarbruch, U.K. (Germany)	III
74. Wildenrath, U.K. (Germany)	III
75. Bruggen, U.K. (Germany)	III
76. Lahr, France (Germany)	III
77. Bremergarten, France (Germany)	III
78. Ghedi, Italy	III
79. Remini, Italy	III
80. Aviano, U.S. (Italy)	III
81. Tanagra, Greece	III
82. Souds, Greece	III

LIST D (Cont'd)

- 14 -

	<u>Name - Country</u>	<u>Priority</u>
83.	Araxos, Greece	III
84.	Andravida, Greece	III
85.	Eskisehir, Turkey	III
86.	Bandirma, Turkey	III
87.	Balikesir, Turkey	III
88.	Diyarbakir, Turkey	III
89.	Gigli, U.S. (Turkey)	III
90.	Incirlik, U.S. (Turkey)	III
91.	Lincoln AFB, U.S.	IV
92.	Lockbourne AFB, U.S.	IV
93.	Pease AFB, U.S.	IV
94.	Bunkerhill AFB, U.S.	IV
95.	Davis Monthan AFB, U.S.	IV
96.	Forbes AFB, U.S.	IV
97.	Little Rock AFB, U.S.	IV
98.	Mountain Home AFB, U.S.	IV
99.	Plattsburgh AFB, U.S.	IV
100.	Schilling AFB, U.S.	IV
101.	Whiteman AFB, U.S.	IV

ANNEX D

OBSERVER TEAMS WITH FOREIGN TROOP UNITS IN GERMANY

A. PURPOSE

The purpose of this Annex is to describe a desirable system of observer teams with foreign troop units in Germany. The modalities described herein are intended to illustrate an acceptable system, but should not be considered minimum requirements for acceptability.

B. BACKGROUND

In a public address in Moscow on July 19, 1963, Premier Khrushchev stated:

"We would also be ready to hold talks with the Western powers on such an agreement: the Western powers could have their representatives with the Soviet troops stationed in the German Democratic Republic, and we, in turn, would have our representatives with the troops of the Western powers, stationed in West Germany."

S. K. Tsarsphin, the USSR delegate, commented as follows on this proposal to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Conference on August 16, 1963:

"There is much to be said for the proposal (ENDC/113, page 3) to send representatives of the Soviet Union to the troops of the Western powers in Western Germany in exchange for the sending of their representatives to the Soviet troops stationed in the German Democratic Republic. This measure seems to us to be all the more expedient, because it would be carried out in that part of Europe where the troops of the two groupings of states--NATO on the one hand and the Warsaw Treaty on the other--are facing each other. It is not necessary to be a highly-qualified military specialist to understand that it is in that area that any preparations for a surprise attack would be particularly noticeable. Furthermore,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals; not

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

any movement of troops and military equipment in that area, even if it is not connected with preparations for an attack, might naturally give rise to suspicion, and consequently, to counter-measures by the armed forces on the other side of the line of demarcation between the two military groupings. Thus, the sending of Soviet representatives to the military forces of the Western powers in Western Germany, in exchange for the sending of representatives of the Western powers to the Soviet troops stationed in the German Democratic Republic, might to some extent contribute toward the easing of the situation in that part of Europe." (ENDC/PV. 152, pages 16-17)

This concept was elaborated upon in detail by Soviet General N. A. Talensky at the unofficial international Pugwash Conference in Yugoslavia in September, 1963. General Talensky proposed that Western observers should live with and eat with Soviet forces at the regiment level, in order to be in a good position to discover any changes in the normal routine of the troops. According to the official press release issued by the Pugwash Conferences:

"Military officers from each side should be stationed and should reside with the troops of the other side within the agreed areas. These officers would have adequate means of communication with their own governments. It was suggested that the details should be worked out by military experts of the countries concerned."

C. GENERAL CONTEXT AND OBJECTIVES

The basic objectives of stationing observers with troop units parallel many of the objectives of observation post systems. By supplying early warning of military activities, the observers could increase the time available for responses designed to prevent the outbreak of hostilities and improve the capabilities for defense. The observer system could help promote increased military stability in Europe, because they

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

would contribute more toward each side's defensive capabilities, than toward its offensive capabilities. By providing reliable, timely information during an international crisis, they could reduce the risks of war through misunderstanding of the military posture of the other side.

In general, observers with troop units in the forward areas complement the capabilities of observation posts monitoring transportation centers far from the lines of confrontation. While the observation posts can give early warning of reinforcements moving toward the forward areas, the observers with the forward troop units could provide early warning of concerted activity which might indicate imminent harassment or attack.

Soviet observers with our troops would certainly obtain some information that we now try to keep secret; however, such loss of Western information would be adequately compensated by comparable acquisition of presently unavailable data on Soviet forces.

There are at present only 13 divisions of foreign troops in West Germany, while the USSR maintains 20 divisions in East Germany. The USSR may be unwilling to accept reciprocal observer teams with such a large disparity in the numbers of teams on each side. Possibly, this asymmetry could be lessened by permitting the USSR to have an equal total number of observers; for example, the USSR might have 6 observers with each division in West Germany, while the West might have 3 observers with each division in the Satellite countries. This would be based in part upon the fact that each Western division consists of nearly twice as many men as does a Soviet division.

D. ILLUSTRATIVE MODALITIES

Although the West should maintain some flexibility in its negotiating position with the Soviet Union on observers with troop units, we should do more than merely respond to the detailed proposals which may be made by the USSR. The usefulness of such an observer system will depend very strongly on the modalities,

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

such as communication facilities, freedom of access, number of observers and where they are stationed. The system described below would be acceptable and might be used as a basis for an initial Western proposal to the Soviet Union.

1. Nature of Teams

The observers in West Germany should all be Soviet officers, and the observers in East Germany should all be officers of either the U.S., the U.K. or France. This Four Power basis is preferable so as to avoid any dealings with the East German regime.

It should be agreed that whenever any additional divisions of foreign troops enter Germany, the other side would be notified immediately, so that observer teams could be dispatched.

The number of observers in each team should be at least three, so as to permit adequate back-up in case of illness, possible need for a 24-hour alert, emergency communication problems, or other contingencies.

The observers should be provided with living quarters near the division headquarters, preferably in the same quarters as are needed by the officers of the division headquarters staff. The observers should eat with the division headquarters officers, and in general, be treated as guests in a manner similar to that customary for Allied liaison officers.

2. Access and Privileges

The observers should be free to travel either by foot or by automobile anywhere they wish throughout the division compound, and also throughout any areas occupied by the troops of the division during maneuvers or redeployment. In addition, the observers should be free to travel along public roads, and any other areas open to the general public. The only restriction on their movements should be that they are not allowed into certain buildings

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 5 -

which might be considered military "sanctuaries." These would include command posts, storage sites for special weapons, airplane hangars, and other buildings containing military equipment. The observers should have, in other respects, privileges and immunities similar to those enjoyed by military liaison officers attached to embassies.

3. Communications

The observers should have the freedom to communicate by long-distance, commercial telephone to their headquarters at any time. The actual reporting schedule used by each side would depend on its evaluation of the current situation.

To illustrate a typical reporting program, each team might report to its headquarters twice each day at staggered times. The Western headquarters would thus receive one scheduled report about every 30 minutes. The reports could be authenticated with a code word so as not to depend exclusively on voice recognition for authentication. Each observer team should have its own private commercial telephone line installed at its living quarters.

If the headquarters fails to receive a report within, say, 15 minutes of the scheduled time, the headquarters will attempt to contact both the observer team and many other teams. It should be part of the agreement that in case satisfactory contact cannot be made by the headquarters with any significant number of teams through normal commercial telephone channels for any reason, other side's central military headquarters in Germany will provide, upon request, emergency radio communications with the observers within 30 minutes. Failure to provide satisfactory contact with several teams would hence constitute prompt early warning of non-cooperation at a high level of authority.

E. CONCLUSIONS

A system of effective observer teams with foreign troop units in Europe would be highly desirable in promoting increased military stability in Central Europe. Because the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 6 -

capability for mounting a surprise attack will be severely limited by the presence of these observers, the observers will help to deter a country from initiating a surprise attack, or failing that, will provide an early warning which will assist the other side to repel the attack. If it is assumed that neither side plans any offensive motion, then the observer teams can be considered a method of mutual reassurance.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ANNEX E

OPERATIONAL MODALITIES FOR OBSERVATION POSTS

(to be supplied at a later date)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ANNEX F

SUMMARY OF PAST DISCUSSIONS OF OBSERVATION POSTS

The question of "ground control posts" to guard against surprise attack was extensively discussed in the Disarmament Subcommittee and in summit correspondence during the period 1955-1957. The Soviet Union initiated the discussion by including in the second stage of a general disarmament plan the establishment of control posts at large ports, railway junctions, main highways, and airfields in the last stage of its comprehensive disarmament plan of May 10, 1955. The Soviet Union said that the control posts were intended to prevent surprise attack by a violator who might succeed in secretly accumulating nuclear weapons stocks in spite of other provisions of the Treaty.

The United States responded by proposing the "open-skies" plan at the Geneva summit meeting of 1955. This plan for reciprocal aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union and the United States and the exchange of military blueprints between the two countries was completely separable and did not provide for the reduction of forces or armaments. Spelling out the plan in later negotiations, the US proposed the use of ground observers to verify information on military establishments. It also offered to extend coverage to foreign countries where American forces were stationed, with the consent of the governments involved.

The Soviets rejected the open-skies plan because it did not provide for disarmament and might be used for intelligence purposes. At first the USSR refused to consider aerial inspection until the final stage of disarmament, but on November 17, 1956, Premier Bulganin proposed to President Eisenhower aerial inspection in a zone 800 kilometers east and west of the line of demarcation between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Forces in Europe as well as ground control posts in this area linked with measures of disarmament. The West felt that this did not include enough Soviet territory, and the Soviets took the position that Western counterproposals moving the median line east of the actual line of demarcation were unacceptable. In the 1957 negotiations in the Disarmament Subcommittee, however, they offered to enlarge their European zone and also suggested zones covering the Far East and the Western United States.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

At the Geneva surprise-attack conference (1958) the Soviet Union described the geographic areas where the posts would be located. It proposed 28 posts in Soviet-bloc countries, including 6 posts in the USSR, as against 54 posts in the NATO and Baghdad Pact countries, including 6 posts in the United States. Airfields were still excluded, unless the West agreed to prohibit nuclear weapons. Each post would be manned by three or four officers from each side, and the ancillary personnel would be provided by the host country. The post commander would also be a host-country officer. The Soviet Union also proposed extension of its European aerial-inspection zone to cover the Baghdad Pact countries, and it proposed a one-third reduction of foreign troops in Europe and a Rapacki-type nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

The Soviet Union did not renounce its previous proposals when it launched its general and complete disarmament plan in 1959, but it showed little interest in Western proposals to study the surprise-attack problem in the Ten Nation Committee, and it rejected an American proposal for UN aerial surveillance advanced after the U-2 episode.

In September 1961 the Soviet Union submitted an eight-point memorandum to the General Assembly in which it advocated early action on a number of partial measures, including ground control posts to prevent surprise attack. The memorandum did not explicitly link the control posts to other disarmament measures, but stated that it "might be accompanied" by reduction of forces and armaments and the eventual withdrawal of forces from the demarcation line.

The US disarmament program of September 25, 1961, contained a provision for ground posts as surprise-attack safeguards, and this was also included in the US Basic Treaty Outline submitted to the Eighteen Nation Committee on April 18, 1962. The Soviet draft disarmament treaty, on the other hand, did not contain any similar provisions. US attempts to bring about a discussion of the ground posts and other risk-of-war measures were unsuccessful. The Soviet representative now took the position that the Soviet memorandum of 1961 linked the ground posts with arms reductions.

The Soviet Union added first-stage risk-of-war measures to its draft treaty on July 13, 1962, but it did not include any provisions for ground or air inspection against surprise

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-3-

attack. The Soviet representative explained that other first-stage measures included in the draft treaty would eliminate the nuclear threat and thereby effectively make strategic surprise impossible.

On December 12, 1962, the United States submitted a working paper on risk of war (ENDC/70 based on DMP 17/1) which included a provision for observation posts at key transportation centers, possibly including "certain significant airfields."

In July 1963 Khrushchev urged the West "to revert to our proposals made as early as 1958 to take some measures to prevent surprise attack." However, when the United States Representative to the ENDC indicated on August 16, 1963 that the United States was prepared to accept an arrangement limited solely to a system of ground observation posts, the Soviet Representative reiterated that such an arrangement must be combined with "certain partial disarmament measures." He went on to state that the USSR was now prepared to accept control posts at airfields, but that the question of aerial photography, which had been included in the 1958 Soviet proposals, "no longer arises today." He concluded by stating that certain other "reasonable modifications" could also be made in the Soviet proposal, but showed no interest in the US approach.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~